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DEFAULT AND ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS
UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9
DONALD J. RAPSON*
INTRODUCTION
At its organizational meeting early in 1993, the Article 9 Drafting
Committee made the decision to put the default and remedies
(hereinafter "enforcement") provisions of Article 9 (present Part 5)
at the top of the list for potential revision. It was a wise and fortunate
decision-and somewhat surprising given that the Drafting
Committee was composed mostly of transactional attorneys and
academics who, as a group, generally have less interest and
experience in that aspect of secured transactions than in the more
intellectually challenging subjects of perfection and priority.
There may have been a belief among most of the Drafting
Committee that review of these provisions would be easy with few
changes, allowing the project to get off to a rapid and good start.
Some of us knew differently. Although Article 9 has been rightfully
lauded as the "jewel" of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"),
the enforcement provisions have been a weak link. Numerous
commentators have recognized that enforcement, particularly the
flexible concept of "commercial reasonableness," has been one of the
most litigated areas in the entire UCC.
* Retired Senior Vice President and Assistant General Counsel of The CIT Group, Inc.;
Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University Law School; Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law
School; Member, Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code; Member,
Article 9 Study Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code; Member, Article 9 Drafting Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (American Law Institute Representative); Adviser, Restatement of the
Law Third, Suretyship and Guaranty.
The views expressed in this article are strictly the personal views of the author and should
in no way be attributed, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication, to The CIT Group,
Inc., or any of its affiliate companies or to the directors, officers, or any other person employed
by or associated with any of these companies.
The author acknowledges with thanks the helpful comments on this article of Professors
Steven L. Harris and Timothy R. Zinnecker.
1. See Robert M. Lloyd, The Absolute Bar Rule in UCC Foreclosure Sales: A Prescription
for Waste, 40 UCLA L. REV. 695, 699 n.22 (1993) ("[S]uits in which the secured party seeks a
deficiency judgment, and the debtor uses the secured party's failure to follow the procedures as
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This appears to have been the result intended by the original
drafters of Article 9. Professor Grant Gilmore, one of the Co-
Reporters and its primary drafter, recounted:
Part 5 of Article 9, which consists of seven lengthy sections, is
devoted to default rights. Despite the considerable amount of
wordage, however, Part 5, rejecting the UCSA [Uniform
Conditional Sales Act] approach of detailed statutory regulation,
opts for a loosely organized, informal, anything-goes type of
foreclosure pattern, subject to ultimate judicial supervision and
control which is explicitly provided for.... The key provision in
Part 5 is that the secured party's disposition of the collateral must
be in all respects "commercially reasonable." This term is
deliberately left undefined, although it is limited by a few statutory
illustrations of reasonableness and unreasonableness. In substance
Article 9 remits to the courts the task of determining standards and
refrains from fashioning a statutory rule.2
That approach is in sharp contrast to the rest of Article 9 which
provides precise rules governing the attachment, perfection, and
priority of security interests in order to minimize uncertainty and the
need for litigation to resolve disputes. Although such an approach
may have been justifiable in the less litigious era of the 1950s, it is no
longer acceptable to state rules governing enforcement rights in a
"loosely organized, informal, anything-goes type of foreclosure
pattern," leaving it to the courts to exercise "supervision and
control."3 That is wasteful, expensive, inefficient, unfair, and
detrimental to secured financing. Secured parties need clear guidance
in establishing practices and procedures when enforcing their rights
and remedies; debtors need protection from arbitrary and capricious
enforcement. This seems particularly evident in light of the fact that
enforcement permits the exercise of nonjudicial self-help -casting the
burden of litigation upon aggrieved debtors who are often financially
unstable and unable to afford expensive and time-consuming
litigation. Moreover, too many court systems in the country are
overburdened and lack the expertise to properly adjudicate
a defense, are the most common type of lawsuits under the UCC."); Timothy R. Zinnecker, The
Default Provisions of Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (pt. 1), 54 BUs. LAW.
1113, 1152 (1999) ("[Olne need only look as far as the nearest treatise to conclude that the term
["commercial reasonableness"] has been the subject of an overwhelming amount of litigation.").
The author has expressed the same view. See Donald J. Rapson, Deficient Treatment of
Deficiency Claims: Gilmore Would Have Repented, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 508 (1997)
("Disputes about the commercial reasonableness of the procedures followed by the secured
party have turned out to be one of the most litigated issues under the [UCC].").
2. 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.1, at 1183-84
(1965).
3. Id. at 1183.
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commercial disputes.
Another consequence of the original drafters' approach is that
the enforcement provisions are inadequately drafted, inexplicably
providing no guidance concerning several fundamental issues. One
well-known example is the failure of the statute to state the
consequences of a failure to comply with the requirements of Part 5,
resulting in three different judicial rules.4 Another example is the
absence of rules for the calculation of deficiencies and the
enforcement of deficiency claims.5 At an early meeting of the
Drafting Committee, a leading consumer advocate characterized
"abusive" deficiency actions as "the most fundamental problem that
consumers have faced under Article 9. '"6 A third example is the
uncertainty as to whether the secured party and debtor may
effectively agree to a voluntary turnover of the collateral to the
secured party in return for a stipulated partial satisfaction of the debt
and the debtor's acknowledgment of liability for the remaining
deficiency.7
The Drafting Committee tackled these issues, as well as many
others, head-on. Discussions were extensive and often contentious
but conscientious and eventually productive. What has emerged is a
thorough overhaul and complete revision of the enforcement
provisions in a new Part 6 comprising twenty-eight sections.
Revised Article 9 has an initial uniform effective date of July 1,
2001. 8 These new enforcement provisions then become the exclusive
means for enforcing security interests arising not only under Revised
Article 9, but also under present Article 9.9 With respect to secured
transactions governed by non-Article 9 law before the effective date
which would be covered by Revised Article 9 if entered into or
created after that date, enforcement can be under that other law or
4. That is, the "absolute bar" rule, the "rebuttable presumption" rule, and the "offset
damages" rule. See R. § 9-626 cmt. 4; Lloyd, supra note 1, at 699-700.
5. See Rapson, supra note 1, at 496-512.
6. Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B
and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 120 (1997); see also David B. McMahon,
Commercially Reasonable Sales and Deficiency Judgments Under U.C.C. Article 9: An Analysis
of Revision Proposals, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 64, 64 (1994) ("[Tlhe use of the ...
'commercially reasonable sale' standard to determine deficiency amounts is not fair.").
7. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (providing for "Acceptance of the Collateral as Discharge of
Obligation"). There is no provision for acceptance in partial satisfaction of the obligation. See
Timothy R. Zinnecker, The Default Provisions of Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (pt. 2), 54 BuS. LAW. 1737, 1765-66 (1999).
8. See R. § 9-701.
9. See id. § 9-702(a). If, however, litigation or another action had commenced before the
effective date, present law will be applicable. See id. § 9-702(c).
1999]
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under Revised Article 9.10
Although Part 6 is captioned "Default," it is important to
recognize that Article 9 does not define the elements of a "default."
That is a matter of contract law determined by the agreement of the
parties. This point is made in the initial provision of Part 6:
[Rights of secured party after default.] After default, a secured
party has the rights provided in this part and, except as otherwise
provided in Section 9-602, those provided by agreement of the
parties .... ;11
and emphasized by the Official Comment:
When Remedies Arise. Under subsection (a) the secured party's
rights arise "[aifter default." Like former Section 9-501, this Article
leaves to the agreement of the parties the circumstances giving rise
to a default. This Article does not determine whether a secured
party's post-default conduct can constitute a waiver of default in
the face of an agreement stating that such conduct shall not
constitute a waiver. Rather, it continues to leave to the parties'
agreement, as supplemented by law other than this Article, the
determination whether a default has occurred or has been waived.
See Section 1-103.12
In exercising its enforcement rights, the secured party needs to
be cognizant of the new rules in Revised Article 9 for determining the
law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection,
and the priority of a security interest in the collateral. 3 The general
rule is that perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction of the
debtor's location.14 There are special rules, however, for goods
covered by a certificate of title, 5 deposit accounts,'16 investment
property, 7 or letter-of-credit rights. 18 In the case of possessory
security interests, perfection is governed by the local law where the
collateral is located. 19 In addition, in those circumstances where
10. See id. § 9-702(b). An example is enforcing a security interest in a deposit account as
original collateral. See id. § 9-109 cmt. 16.
11. Id. § 9-601(a).
12. Id. § 9-601 cmt. 3.
13. See id. § 9-301.
14. See id. § 9-301(1), 9-301 cmt. 4. The debtor's location is determined under Revised
section 9-307. For example, the location of a "registered organization," e.g., a corporation, is its
state of organization, i.e., state of incorporation. See id. § 9-307(e). "Debtor" is defined in
Revised section 9-102(a)(28) and includes a person with a property interest in the collateral.
15. See id. § 9-303.
16. See id. § 9-304.
17. See id. § 9-305.
1M See id. § 9-306.
19. See id. § 9-301(2).
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tangible or semi-intangible property0 is located in a jurisdiction that
is different than the debtor's location, perfection is governed by the
local law of the debtor's location, but "the effect of perfection or
nonperfection and the priority of a nonpossessory security interest" is
determined by the local law of the jurisdiction where the property is
located.21 For example, if the debtor was a Delaware corporation that
granted a security interest in equipment located in New Jersey,
perfection would be governed by Delaware law, but if the secured
party exercised its enforcement rights against the collateral in New
Jersey, priority disputes with other secured creditors or lien creditors
would be governed by New Jersey law.22
Parts I, II, and III of this article examine the three basic methods
of enforcement of security interests after default under Revised
Article 9: collection and enforcement (Part I); repossession and
disposition of collateral ("nonjudicial foreclosure") (Part II); and
acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation
("strict foreclosure") (Part III). Part IV examines the special rules
affecting enforcement of security interests in lease and license
agreements. Part V examines special provisions in Revised Article 9
that resolve (and fail to resolve23) important uncertainties under
existing law: the consequences of a secured party's noncompliance
with Article 9's enforcement requirements on deficiency claims,24 and
the applicability of Article 9's enforcement requirements to certain
assignments that take place upon default.
I. COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BY SECURED PARTY
Revised section 9-60721 replaces UCC section 9-502. It sets forth
20. That is, negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, and tangible chattel paper.
21. See R. § 9-301(3)(c).
22. See id. § 9-301 cmt. 7. All other matters of enforcement are determined by the Code's
general choice of law rule under UCC section 1-105. Usually, this rule validates the choice
agreed to by the parties.
23. A last-minute "compromise" between consumer and consumer-creditor advocates had
the unfortunate consequence of leaving some of these issues to courts for "the determination of
the proper rules in consumer transactions." Id. § 9-626(b) (dealing with the consequences of
noncompliance); see infra text accompanying notes 277-87. For a report of that compromise, see
REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9-SECURED TRANSACTIONS,
REPORTER'S PREFATORY COMMENTS $ 5(j) (1998), submitted to National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its Annual Meeting July 24-31, 1998, Cleveland,
Ohio.
24. See supra text accompanying note 5; infra text accompanying notes 270-76.
25. Revised section 9-607 provides:




the rights, as between the secured party and the debtor, of the
secured party to exercise collection and enforcement rights against
third persons after default-or even earlier if so agreed between the
secured party and debtor. This article focuses on the post-default
aspect. Revised section 9-607 is much more expansive than prior law
in making clear that the statute is applicable to collection and
enforcement not only against a person who is an "account debtor, 2 6
but also against any "other person obligated to make payment or
otherwise render performance to or for the benefit of the secured
party, '2 7 e.g., a guarantor. Both types of "persons" are defined more
(1) may notify an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to make
payment or otherwise render performance to or for the benefit of the secured
party;
(2) may take any proceeds to which the secured party is entitled under Section
9-315;
(3) may enforce the obligations of an account debtor or other person obligated
on collateral and exercise the rights of the debtor with respect to the
obligation of the account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to
make payment or otherwise render performance to the debtor, and with
respect to any property that secures the obligations of the account debtor or
other person obligated on the collateral;
(4) if it holds a security interest in a deposit account perfected by control under
Section 9-104(a)(1), may apply the balance of the deposit account to the
obligation secured by the deposit account; and
(5) if it holds a security interest in a deposit account perfected by control under
Section 9-104(a)(2) or (3), may instruct the bank to pay the balance of the
deposit account to or for the benefit of the secured party.
(b) [Nonjudicial enforcement of mortgage.] If necessary to enable a secured party to
exercise under subsection (a)(3) the right of a debtor to enforce a mortgage
nonjudicially, the secured party may record in the office in which a record of the
mortgage is recorded:
(1) a copy of the security agreement that creates or provides for a security
interest in the obligation secured by the mortgage; and
(2) the secured party's sworn affidavit in recordable form stating that:
(A) a default has occurred; and
(B) the secured party is entitled to enforce the mortgage nonjudicially.
(c) [Commercially reasonable collection and enforcement.] A secured party shall
proceed in a commercially reasonable manner if the secured party:
(1) undertakes to collect from or enforce an obligation of an account debtor or
other person obligated on collateral; and
(2) is entitled to charge back uncollected collateral or otherwise to full or limited
recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor.
(d) [Expenses of collection and enforcement.] A secured party may deduct from the
collections made pursuant to subsection (c) reasonable expenses of collection and
enforcement, including reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses incurred by
the secured party.
(e) [Duties to secured party not affected.] This section does not determine whether
an account debtor, bank, or other person obligated on collateral owes a duty to a
secured party.
26. Revised section 9-102(a)(3) provides: "'Account debtor' means a person obligated on
an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The term does not include persons obligated to
pay a negotiable instrument, even if the instrument constitutes part of chattel paper."
27. R. § 9-607(a)(1).
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broadly than under present law.
A. "Account Debtor"
Revised Article 9's definition of "account debtor" first clarifies
whether an obligor 28 on an "instrument" 29 is an account debtor even
when the instrument is part of "chattel paper."30 If the instrument is
negotiable, the obligor is not an "account debtor" and its duties are
always governed by UCC Article 3, not Article 9.31 In contrast, "the
duties of an obligor on a nonnegotiable instrument are governed by
non-Article 9 law unless the nonnegotiable instrument is a part of
chattel paper, in which case the obligor is an account debtor. 32
This is explained in an informative Official Comment:
"Account Debtor." An "account debtor" is a person obligated on
an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The account
debtor's obligation often is a monetary obligation; however, this is
not always the case. For example, if a franchisee uses its rights
under a franchise agreement (a general intangible) as collateral,
then the franchisor is an "account debtor." As a general matter,
Article 3, and not Article 9, governs obligations on negotiable
instruments. Accordingly, the definition of "account debtor"
excludes obligors on negotiable instruments constituting part of
chattel paper. The principal effect of this change from the
definition in former Article 9 is that the rules in Sections 9-403,
9-404, 9-405, and 9-406, dealing with the rights of an assignee and
duties of an account debtor, do not apply to an assignment of
chattel paper in which the obligation to pay is evidenced by a
negotiable instrument. (Section 9-406(d), however, does apply to
promissory notes, including negotiable promissory notes.) Rather,
28. "Obligor" is a new term defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(59) and includes a person
who owes "payment or other performance of the obligation." See infra note 95 (quoting entire
definition). It includes a "debtor," a "secondary obligor," and a principal obligor. The last is a
person who is principally liable for the obligation but has not provided any collateral and,
therefore, is not a "debtor." See R. § 9-102 cmt. 2a; infra text accompanying notes 87-96.
29. "Instrument" under present and Revised Article 9 includes both negotiable and non-
negotiable instruments. Revised section 9-102(a)(47) provides:
"Instrument" means a negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right
to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and
is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any
necessary indorsement or assignment. The term does not include (i) investment
property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings that evidence a right to payment arising
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the
card.
30. "Chattel paper" is defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(11) and includes a security
agreement or lease taken together as a group with "an instrument or series of instruments." See
infra note 292 (quoting entire definition).
31. The term "account debtor" expressly excludes "persons obligated to pay a negotiable
instrument, even if the instrument constitutes part of chattel paper." R. § 9-102(a)(3).
32. Id. § 9-102 cmt. 5h.
1999]
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the assignee's rights are governed by Article 3. Similarly, the duties
of an obligor on a nonnegotiable instrument are governed by non-
Article 9 law unless the nonnegotiable instrument is a part of
chattel paper, in which case the obligor is an account debtor.33
Thus, "account debtor" not only includes a person having a
monetary obligation, but also includes a person with a performance
obligation, e.g., a franchisor, lessor, or licensor. This is important to
keep in mind in analyzing the secured party's rights of enforcement
against an "account debtor" in those circumstances where the debtor
has granted a security interest in its rights as franchisee, lessee, or
licensee.34 Revised section 9-607 tells us against whom the secured
party has rights of enforcement, e.g., a franchisor, lessor, or licensor.
It does not, however, determine whether an account debtor or other
person obligated on collateral actually owes a duty to the secured
party. That issue is governed by other provisions of Revised Article 9
and other law.35
B. "Other person obligated on collateral"
This phrase not only covers "the obligor on an instrument"
referred to in present law,36 but also includes the debtor's rights
against other persons in addition to the account debtor or obligor on
an instrument.37 This would include the debtor's rights against persons
under contracts relating to the collateral arising out of covenants,
representations, and warranties that may have been breached. These
kinds of claims "typically would be proceeds of original collateral
under Section 9-315."13 For example, a secured party's security
interest in "general intangibles" would include the debtor's rights as
the owner of real estate which is the subject of a construction contract
with a builder to claim damages for the builder's failure to properly
construct the building.39
"Other persons obligated on collateral" would also include a
bank that maintains a deposit account serving as collateral. The
mortgagor under a mortgage which has been assigned by the
mortgagee as collateral is a person "obligated on collateral." The
33. Id.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 216-27.
35. See R. § 9-607(e), 9-607 cmt. 6.
36. See U.C.C. § 9-502(1).
37. See R. § 9-607 cmt. 3.
38. Id.
39. See CIT Group/Equip. Fin. v. ACEC Me., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 159 (D. Me. 1992).
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phrase also includes persons liable on a "supporting obligation,' 40 i.e.,
a guarantor, a person providing collateral to secure the obligations of
an account debtor or obligor on an instrument, or the issuer of a letter
of credit.41 Revised Article 9 provides that the attachment of the
secured party's security interest in the original collateral
automatically attaches to "a supporting obligation for the collateral"
just as it attaches to proceeds. 4 It is important to reiterate that the
secured party's enforcement rights against persons liable on
supporting obligations are governed by other provisions of Article 9
and by other law. 43
C. Collections by Subordinate Secured Parties
Revised Article 9 confronts the difficult and controversial
problem that sometimes arises when a subordinate ("junior") secured
party collects from an account debtor or other person obligated on
the collateral. Under present law, the junior secured party may be
entitled to retain the proceeds of the collection (e.g., a check) free of
the claim of a senior secured party to those same proceeds if the
junior secured party qualifies either as a holder in due course44 or as a
"purchaser" taking possession of the instrument. 45 Revised Article 9
continues the rule allowing a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument to "take priority over an earlier security interest, even if
perfected ' 46 and makes it even easier for a purchaser of the
instrument to attain priority by eliminating the requirements that the
purchaser give "new value" and that the purchase be "in the ordinary
course of" the purchaser's business.47
There are some factual circumstances when the junior secured
40. Revised section 9-102(a)(77) provides: "'Supporting obligation' means a letter-of-credit
right or secondary obligation that supports the payment or performance of an account, chattel
paper, a document, a general intangible, an instrument, or investment property."
41. See R. § 9-607 cmt. 3.
42. See id. § 9-203(f).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35; infra text accompanying notes 216-27.
44. See U.C.C. § 3-302; U.C.C. § 9-309.
45. UCC section 9-308 gives priority under some circumstances to a purchaser of chattel
paper or instruments "who gives new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of
his business."
46. R. § 9-331(a).
47. See id. § 9-330(d). These requirements, however, are not eliminated for purchasers of
chattel paper. See id. § 9-330(a)-(b); Donald J. Rapson, "Receivables" Financing Under Revised
Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 160-61 (1999); Donald J. Rapson, "Receivables" Financing
Under Revised Article 9, 55 SECURED LENDER 8, 30 (1999) (updated version of the article in
American Bankruptcy Law Journal).
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party should not be able to attain such priority, and the Article 9
Drafting Committee spent considerable time attempting to provide a
statutory formulation 48 that would define those circumstances.
Eventually, the Drafting Committee concluded that there was no one
"right answer" and that the requirement of "good faith," which is
broadened under Revised Article 9 to include "observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, ' 49 should be a
critical factor in deterring inappropriate conduct and in determining
whether and when junior secured parties should attain such priority.
An Official Comment directly addresses the issue:
Collections by Junior Secured Party. Under this section, a
secured party with a junior security interest in receivables
(accounts, chattel paper, promissory notes, or payment intangibles)
may collect and retain the proceeds of those receivables free of the
claim of a senior secured party to the same receivables, if the junior
secured party is a holder in due course of the proceeds. In order to
qualify as a holder in due course, the junior must satisfy the
requirements of Section 3-302, which include taking in "good
faith." This means that the junior not only must act "honestly" but
also must observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing" under the particular circumstances. See Section 9-102(a).
Although "good faith" does not impose a general duty of inquiry,
e.g., a search of the records in filing offices, there may be
circumstances in which "reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing" would require such a search.
Consider, for example, a junior secured party in the business of
financing or buying accounts who fails to undertake a search to
determine the existence of prior security interests. Because a
search, under the usages of trade of that business, would enable it
to know or learn upon reasonable inquiry that collecting the
accounts violated the rights of a senior secured party, the junior
may fail to meet the good-faith standard. See Utility Contractors
Financial Services, Inc. v. Amsouth Bank, NA, 985 F.2d 1554 (11th
Cir. 1993). Likewise, a junior secured party who collects accounts
when it knows or should know under the particular circumstances
that doing so would violate the rights of a senior secured party,
because the debtor had agreed not to grant a junior security
interest in, or sell, the accounts, may not meet the good-faith test.
Thus, if a junior secured party conducted or should have conducted
a search and a financing statement filed on behalf of the senior
secured party states such a restriction, the junior's collection would
not meet the good-faith standard. On the other hand, if there was a
course of performance between the senior secured party and the
debtor which placed no such restrictions on the debtor and allowed
48. See Rapson, supra note 47, at 149-52.
49. R. § 9-102(a)(43).
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the debtor to collect and use the proceeds without any restrictions,
the junior secured party may then satisfy the requirements for
being a holder in due course. This would be more likely in those
circumstances where the junior secured party was providing
additional financing to the debtor on an on-going basis by lending
against or buying the accounts and had no notice of any restrictions
against doing so. Generally, the senior secured party would not be
prejudiced because the practical effect of such payment to the
junior secured party is little different than if the debtor itself had
made the collections and subsequently paid the secured party from
the debtor's general funds. Absent collusion, the junior secured
party would take the funds free of the senior security interests. See
Section 9-332. In contrast, the senior secured party is likely to be
prejudiced if the debtor is going out of business and the junior
secured party collects the accounts by notifying the account debtors
to make payments directly to the junior. Those collections may not
be consistent with "reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing."
Whether the junior secured party qualifies as a holder in due
course is fact-sensitive and should be decided on a case-by-case
basis in the light of those circumstances. Decisions such as Financial
Management Services Inc. v. Familian, 905 P.2d 506 (Ariz. App.
Div. 1995) (finding holder in due course status) could be
determined differently under this application of the good-faith
requirement.50
This Comment deliberately makes the result uncertain in some
situations, leaving the issue to be resolved "on a case-by-case basis."
This uncertainty is not designed to promote litigation but to deter
junior secured parties from engaging in questionable courses of action
that invite litigation. By using "good faith" to prevent the holder in
due course rule from being a way of avoiding the priority rules of
Article 9, while, at the same time, preserving the protection afforded
by the holder in due course rule for appropriate circumstances, junior
secured parties may be constrained from imprudent conduct.5' It
should be borne in mind that this issue is not limited to the collection
of accounts; it also exists with respect to the collection of other kinds
of receivables, i.e., chattel paper, promissory notes, and payment
intangibles.
50. Id. § 9-331 cmt. 5; see also id. §§ 9-330 cmt. 7, 9-607 cmt. 5.
51. A junior secured party may be entitled to retain the proceeds of the collection in
circumstances where it does not qualify as a holder in due course but does qualify as a
"purchaser" taking possession of the instrument. See id. § 9-330(d), 9-330 cmt. 7. The constraints
imposed by the "good faith" requirement, however, are also applicable. See id. § 9-330 cmts. 6-7.
1999]
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D. Specialized Kinds of Collection
1. Deposit Accounts
Security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral are
now within the scope of Revised Article 9.52 Perfection can only be by
"control"53 which is automatic if the secured party is the bank with
which the account is maintained.5 4 "Control" by other secured parties
is achieved by the debtor, secured party, and bank entering into a
control agreement "that the bank will comply with instructions
originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in
the account without further consent by the debtor '55 or "the secured
party becomes the bank's customer with respect to the deposit
account. 5 6 A security interest held by the bank, even if later in time,
has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another party
unless the other party has perfected its interest by either becoming
the bank's customer57 or by a control agreement with the bank
expressly agreeing to subordinate its security interest.5 8
Security interests in deposit accounts can be readily enforced by
the bank that maintains the account by applying "the balance of the
deposit account to the obligation secured by the deposit account. '59
Other secured parties who have perfected by control 6 "may instruct
the bank to pay the balance of the deposit account to or for the
benefit of the secured party. '61 In that circumstance the bank is a
"person obligated on collateral. ' 62 The bank must comply with this
instruction if the secured party is the bank's "customer," but if
perfection is by a "control agreement," only if the agreement so
provides.63 Otherwise, the bank has no duty to obey those
52 See id. § 9-109(a), 9-109 cmt. 16. They are excluded as original collateral under present
law. See U.C.C. § 9-104(o. Perfection by filing in the deposit account as identifiable cash
proceeds of other collateral continues to be permissible. See R. §§ 9-312 cmt. 5, 9-315.
53. See R. §§ 9-312(b)(1), 9-314(b).
54. See id. § 9-104(a)(1). We can expect that banks will almost always routinely take a
security interest in the deposit account agreement.
55. Id. § 9-104(a)(2). The bank, however, "may exercise any right of recoupment or set-
off." Id. § 9-340(a).
56. Id. § 9-104(a)(3). In this circumstance, the bank can only exercise a right of recoupment
against the deposit account; it cannot set-off a claim against the debtor. See id. § 9-340(c).
57. See id. §§ 9-104(a)(3), 9-327 cmt. 4.
58. See id. §§ 9-104(a)(2), 9-339.
59. Id. § 9-607(a)(4).
60. See id. § 9-104(a)(2)-(3).
61. Id. § 9-607(a)(5).
62. Id. § 9-607(a)(1); see supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
63. See R. § 9-607 cmt. 7.
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instructions" and the secured party must then resort to judicial
procedures,65 e.g., attachment, garnishment, or levy and execution
under a court order or judgment.
2. Mortgages
Often, the secured party takes as collateral the debtor's rights as
a mortgagee of real property-but may not have received a
recordable assignment enabling it to become the mortgagee of record.
The secured party has a right of enforcement against the mortgagor
as a "person obligated on collateral." 66 If permitted under real
property mortgage law, the secured party may seek to nonjudicially
foreclose that mortgage if the mortgagor is in default. Revised Article
967 provides a helpful mechanism enabling the secured party "to
become the assignee of record by recording in the applicable real-
property records the security agreement and an affidavit certifying
default. '68 This enables the secured party to foreclose the mortgage
nonjudicially if it can do so under applicable real property mortgage
law.
E. Commercial Reasonableness
As under present law,69 a secured party that exercises its
collection and enforcement rights is required to "proceed in a
commercially reasonable manner.' 70 There is no requirement of
notice to the debtor. The secured party may deduct from the
collections "reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement,
including reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses" incurred in
proceeding against an account debtor or other third party.71 Revised
Article 9 also follows present law72 in specifying that a secured party
must "account to and pay a debtor for any surplus, and the obligor is
64. See id. § 9-341.
65. See id. § 9-607 cmt. 7.
66. See id. § 9-607(a)(1); supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
67. See R. § 9-607(b).
68. Id. § 9-607 cmt. 8.
69. See U.C.C. § 9-502(2).
70. R. § 9-607(c).
71. See id. § 9-607(d). The reference to the deduction of "attorney's fees and legal
expenses" clarifies what had been implicit under present law. The phrase does not, however,
refer to attorney's fees and legal expenses incurred in proceeding against the debtor or
obligor-the secured party's right to recover those costs is determined by the agreement of the
parties. See id. § 9-607 cmt. 10; see also id. § 9-608(a)(1)(A).
72 See U.C.C. § 9-502(2).
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liable for any deficiency"" -unless the "underlying transaction is a
sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory
notes."
7 4
A new provision deals with noncash proceeds of collection and
enforcement:
A secured party need not apply or pay over for application noncash
proceeds of collection and enforcement under this section unless
the failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. A
secured party that applies or pays over for application noncash
proceeds shall do so in a commercially reasonable manner.75
An Official Comment explains this provision with an example:
Noncash Proceeds. Subsection (a)(3) addresses the situation in
which an enforcing secured party receives noncash proceeds.
Example: An enforcing secured party receives a
promissory note from the account debtor who is unable to
pay an account when it is due. The secured party accepts
the note in exchange for extending the date on which the
account debtor's obligation is due. The secured party may
wish to credit its debtor (the assignor) with the principal
amount of the note upon receipt of the note, but probably
will prefer to credit the debtor only as and when the note
is paid.
Under subsection (a)(3), the secured party is under no duty to
apply the note or its value to the outstanding obligation unless its
failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. If the secured
party does apply the note to the outstanding obligation, however, it
must do so in a commercially reasonable manner. The parties may
provide for the method of application of noncash proceeds by
agreement, if the method is not manifestly unreasonable. See
Section 9-603. This section does not explain when the failure to
apply noncash proceeds would be commercially unreasonable; it
leaves that determination to case-by-case adjudication. In the
example, the secured party appears to have accepted the account
debtor's note in order to increase the likelihood of payment and
decrease the likelihood that the account debtor would dispute its
obligation. Under these circumstances, it may well be commercially
reasonable for the secured party to credit its debtor's obligations
only as and when cash proceeds are collected from the account
debtor, especially given the uncertainty that attends the account
73. R. § 9-608(a)(4). Note that "obligor" includes the "debtor" who provided the collateral.
See id. § 9-102 cmt. 2a; supra note 28; infra text accompanying note 95.
74. R. § 9-608(b). The concluding sentence appearing in UCC section 9-502(2) does not
appear in Revised Article 9: "But, if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel
paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the security
agreement so provides." No substantive change is intended by the deletion-the sentence was
surplusage.
75. Id. § 9-608(a)(3).
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debtor's eventual payment. For an example of a secured party's
receipt of noncash proceeds in which it may well be commercially
unreasonable for the secured party to delay crediting its debtor's
obligations with the value of noncash proceeds, see Section 9-615,
Comment 3.
When the secured party is not required to "apply or pay over
for application noncash proceeds," the proceeds nonetheless
remain collateral subject to this Article. If the secured party were
to dispose of them, for example, appropriate notification would be
required (see Section 9-611), and the disposition would be subject
to the standards provided in this Part (see Section 9-610).
Moreover, a secured party in possession of the noncash proceeds
would have the duties specified in Section 9-207.76
Although seemingly noncontroversial in and of itself in this context,
the same provision also appears (as noted in the Official Comment)
in a later section dealing with foreclosures. 77 The failure to credit the
debtor with the value of the noncash proceeds in that context is more
likely to be commercially unreasonable. 78
II. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
Present and Revised Article 9 both state that after default, a
secured party may "foreclose" 79-but never define the word itself.
"Foreclosure" means "[t]o shut out, to bar, to destroy an equity of
redemption.... The process by which a mortgagor of real or personal
property, or other owner of property subject to a lien, is deprived of
his interest therein, '"' i.e., to "cut-off" the interest in the collateral of
the debtor or of any other person claiming an interest that is
subordinate to that of the foreclosing party. Foreclosure can be by a
judicial proceeding or by nonjudicial means. This article focuses on
nonjudical foreclosure.
The loose and informal approach of present Article 9 to
foreclosure is demonstrated by the skeletal statutory guidance on the
procedure for conducting foreclosures. The key provision states:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts.
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any
time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be
76. Id. § 9-608 cmt. 4.
77. See id. § 9-615(c).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 172-75.
79. See U.C.C. § 9-501(1); R. § 9-601(a)(1).
80. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 646 (6th ed. 1990).
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commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or
threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily
sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time
and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time
after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be
made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not
signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right
to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other
notification need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to
any other secured party from whom the secured party has received
(before sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's
renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in
the collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if
the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or
is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price
quotations he may buy at private sale;81
and is supplemented by an explanation of "commercially reasonable
manner":
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a
different time or in a different method from that selected by the
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was
not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured
party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any
recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current in such
market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in
conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in
the type of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable
manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with
respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other types of
disposition. A disposition which has been approved in any judicial
proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or
representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be
commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate that
any such approval must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate
that any disposition not so approved is not commercially
reasonable. 82
There is no more statutory guidance.
In contrast, although Revised Article 9 repeats these provisions,83
it contains new provisions detailing to whom and when notice of
disposition should be sent,84 the contents of the notification, including
a "safe-harbor" form for all non-consumer-goods transactions, 85 and
mandatory requirements for the contents of the notification in
81. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
82. Id. § 9-507(2).
83. See R. §§ 9-610(a)-(b), 9-627.
84. See id. §§ 9-611, 9-612.
85. See id. § 9-613.
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consumer-goods transactions with another safe-harbor form.86
A. Notification
1. To Whom
First, an "authenticated notification of disposition"87 must be
sent88 to the debtor89 and any "secondary obligor." 90 Although the
former is certainly consistent with present law,91 the latter settles an
existing uncertainty92 and should be read in conjunction with another
new provision that clarifies that secondary obligors, such as
guarantors, cannot effectively waive the requirements of notification
or "commercial reasonableness" 93 prior to default.9 4
Notification need not be given, however, to an "obligor 95 if it is
neither a "debtor" nor a "secondary obligor." "Obligor" includes not
only a person who is a debtor or a secondary obligor, but also a
person who is primarily liable for the obligation ("principal obligor")
but did not provide collateral securing the obligation and, therefore,
is not a "debtor." The rationale is that because such a person is liable
in any event for the full amount of the obligation, there is no need for
86. See id. § 9-614.
87. Id. § 9-611(b).
88. See id. § 9-611(c)(l)-(2). This would include electronic notice. See id. § 9-102(a)(7)
(defining "authenticate"), 9-102 cmt. 9b.
89. "Debtor" includes a person with a property interest in the collateral. See id.
§ 9-102(a)(28)(A).
90. "Secondary obligor" is defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(71) to mean "an obligor to
the extent that: (A) the obligor's obligation is secondary; or (B) the obligor has a right of
recourse with respect to an obligation secured by collateral against the debtor, another obligor,
or property of either."
91. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
92. Is a guarantor a "debtor" as defined in UCC section 9-105(1)(d) and, thus, protected by
the non-waivable rules of UCC section 9-501(3)(b)? See Harry C. Sigman, Guarantors' Pre-
Default Waivers of Article 9 Debtors' Rights to Notice and Commercially Reasonable Disposition
Should Be Effective, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 627, 629, 644 (1992) (analyzing conflicting judicial
decisions and concluding that the courts "have been deficient. No sound policy argument has
been set forth in the decisions"; and urging that waivers of notice of disposition and defense of
commercial unreasonableness made by guarantors who were not owners of the collateral should
be effective-a position first adopted by the Drafting Committee for commercial transactions
but reversed at the end of the drafting process).
93. See R. § 9-602 cmt. 4.
94. Waiver of notification is permitted after default. See id. § 9-624(a).
95. "Obligor" is defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(59) to mean
a person that, with respect to an obligation secured by a security interest in or an
agricultural lien on the collateral, (i) owes payment or other performance of the
obligation, (ii) has provided property other than the collateral to secure payment or
other performance of the obligation, or (iii) is otherwise accountable in whole or in
part for payment or other performance of the obligation. The term does not include
issuers or nominated persons under a letter of credit.
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notification because the person cannot be prejudiced by lack of
notice.96 Secured parties may, nevertheless, continue to give notice to
such a person as a matter of habit and business prudence.
If the collateral is other than consumer goods, Revised Article 9
also requires that notice be given to "any other person from which the
secured party has received, before the notification date, an
authenticated notification of a claim of an interest in the collateral. ' '97
This is not new-indeed, it is the only way junior secured parties have
a right to get notice under present law98-imposing a significant
search and monitoring burden upon such parties. What is significantly
new, however, is that notice must also be given to all secured parties
(i.e., senior as well as junior) who, ten days before the notification
date, have perfected their security interests by filing a financing
statement or by complying with other applicable law, e.g., a certificate
of title statute.99 This, of course, is a complete reversal of present law
and a return to the Article 9 rule prior to its amendment in 1972.100
Junior secured parties who want notice of the foreclosure no longer
have to search for senior secured parties and then notify them of their
claim of interest in the collateral.1°1 Instead, the traditional search and
notification burden is imposed upon foreclosing parties.
Revised Article 9 alleviates the foreclosing party's notification
burden by affording a "safe-harbor" if "not later than 20 days or
earlier than 30 days before the notification date, [it] requests, in a
commercially reasonable manner" a search of UCC financing
statements from the correct filing office and either receives no
response or a response containing information about other secured
96. See R. § 9-102 cmt. 2a; supra note 28. In contrast, a person who is a "debtor" because
he provided collateral securing the obligation of the principal obligor would be prejudiced by a
lack of notice even though he is entitled to reimbursement or restitution from the principal
obligor under suretyship principles as a "secondary obligor." See supra note 90. The ability to
obtain reimbursement or restitution is, of course, problematic and dependent upon the financial
circumstances of the principal obligor.
97. R. § 9-611(c)(3)(A). "Notification date" means the earlier of the date (i) the secured
party sends the notice to the debtor and any secondary obligor or (ii) both waive, after default,
their right to notice. See id. § 9-611(a); see also id. § 9-624(a) (providing for waiver of disposition
notification). In most cases, the former will be the operative date.
98. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
99. See R. § 9-611(c)(3)(B)-(C). The notice must also be given to any "lienholder" who
perfected its interest by filing a financing statement. See id. § 9-611(c)(3)(B). This would include
the holder of an "agricultural lien" which is now within the scope of Revised Article 9, see id.
§§ 9-109(a)(2), 9-310(a), and any other lien that may, under a non-uniform provision, be
required to file a financing statement in order to perfect its interest.
100. See id. § 9-611 cmt. 4.
101. See supra text accompanying note 99.
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parties, but not all others because the search is not currentl o0 If the
foreclosing party sends notices to all those parties reflected on the
search report, it has complied with the notification requirements and
is protected. 13 This means that a secured party who should have been
revealed by the search report "has no remedy against a foreclosing
secured party who does not send the notification"'1 even though the
foreclosure discharges its security interest. 105
Notice must also be sent to all senior secured parties from whom
the foreclosing party has either received notice °6 or of which it learns
from a UCC search of financing statements, 1° or who have perfected
their security interests under other applicable law, °8 even though the
foreclosure will not discharge senior security interests.',9 This is an
important and useful change. Senior secured parties have an
important interest in getting notice of a foreclosure by a junior
secured party. That foreclosure may constitute an event of default
that entitles the senior secured party to exercise its own enforcement
rights. It can then preempt the junior's foreclosure with its own
foreclosure action. Even if the senior secured party does not foreclose
at that point, it can monitor the foreclosure conducted by the junior
secured party and determine the identity, credit-worthiness, and
reliability of the purchaser of the collateral which will still be subject
to its senior security interest. The senior can then decide on its own
course of action. Getting advance notice of the junior's foreclosure is
particularly important when the collateral is inventory or intangible
collateral because, although the senior security interest remains
attached to the collateral, the collateral may be hard to locate or be
dissipated after the foreclosure sale.
Furthermore, by requiring notice to senior secured parties,
Revised Article 9 provides a rational resolution of the issue under
present law as to whether the junior secured party may keep the cash
102. See R. § 9-611(e), 9-611 cmt. 4.
103. See id. § 9-611(e).
104. Id. § 9-611 cmt. 4. It would have a remedy, however, if it had given the foreclosing party
"notification of a claim of an interest in the collateral." Id. § 9-611(c)(3)(A), 9-611 cmt. 4. For
this reason, junior secured parties should continue to follow the procedure under present law of
giving such notification to senior secured parties. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
105. See R. § 9-617(a)(3); cf. infra text accompanying note 109.
106. See R. § 9-611(c)(3)(A).
107. See id. § 9-611(c)(3)(B).
108. See id. § 9-611(c)(3)(C).
109. This is a fundamental rule. See id. § 9-617(a)(3) (providing that the foreclosure only
"discharges any subordinate security interest or other subordinate lien," other than specific liens
under special state acts or statutes, e.g., taxes).
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proceeds of its foreclosure or must pay them over to the senior
secured party. 110 Revised Article 9 provides that the junior can "take[]
the cash proceeds free of the security interest or other lien" if it
receives them "in good faith and without knowledge that the receipt
violates the rights of the holder of the security interest or other lien
that is not subordinate."'' By requiring the junior to notify the senior
secured party in advance of the foreclosure sale, the senior can take
appropriate action to protect its own interests and reach the cash
proceeds. The senior secured party can either commence its own
foreclosure action or it can notify the junior secured party that receipt
of the cash proceeds violates its rights and demand that the junior
secured party pay over the proceeds.',2 If, however, the senior secured
party takes no action, mere knowledge of the senior's security interest
will not prevent the junior from keeping the cash proceeds. But, if the
UCC search conducted by the junior secured party revealed a
financing statement filed by the senior secured party containing a
statement to the effect that "retention of cash proceeds by any
subordinate secured party violates the rights of the secured party
identified herein," the junior secured party may not be able to keep
the cash proceeds. The plain meaning of the statute indicates that the
foreclosing junior secured party would not then be "in good faith and
without knowledge that the receipt violates the rights of the" senior
secured party. 113 On the other hand, merely stating that receipt of the
110. See generally Cynthia Starnes, U.C.C. Section 9-504 Sales by Junior Secured Parties: Is a
Senior Secured Party Entitled to Notice and Proceeds?, 52 U. PitT. L. REV. 563, 600-01 (1991)
(describing present law as "a source of confusion and concern" and recommending amendment
of Article 9 "to require a foreclosing party to notify all secured parties whose interests are on
file" -substantially as has been done in Revised Article 9).
111. R. § 9-615(g). The phrase "violates the rights of the holder of the security interest,"
which is used in several provisions in Revised Article 9, see, e.g., id. § 9-330, is drawn from the
definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business" in UCC section 1-201(9).
112. Does that notification, in and of itself, suffice? If so, senior secured parties should give
such notification as a matter of course-making this exception to the statute, the rule. If the
junior pays over the cash proceeds or sufficient proceeds to satisfy the obligation owed to the
senior secured party, the junior should then be subrogated to the senior's security interest. But
what if these cash proceeds only partially satisfy the obligation?
113. See R. § 9-615(g). Revised Article 9 appears to sanction the use of the financing
statement as a so-called "bulletin board" to protect the interests of senior secured parties
against (i) the granting of junior security interests, (ii) collections of accounts and receivables by
junior secured parties, and (iii) purchases of chattel paper by subsequent financers. It would
seem that the "bulletin board" could also be used for this purpose of reaching cash proceeds
received by the junior-unless it can be said that the senior secured party's statement that a
particular course of action "violates its rights" does not necessarily mean that it has such rights
or that they would be violated, For a broader discussion of the potential problems raised by the
use of the financing statement as a "bulletin board" to convey "knowledge" that a particular
action "violates the rights of the secured party," see Rapson, supra note 47, at 146-47, 161-62.
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cash proceeds "violates the rights" of the senior secured party may
not, in and of itself, be sufficient to require a turnover. Arguably, it is
too simple a way of negating the protection afforded by the statute to
junior secured parties.114 Future events and practices will determine
the impact of this provision.
2. Contents of Notification
Revised Article 9 provides that in a non-consumer-goods
transaction, the "contents of a notification of disposition are
sufficient" if the notification:
(A) describes the debtor and the secured party;
(B) describes the collateral that is the subject of the intended
disposition;
(C) states the method of intended disposition;
(D) states that the debtor is entitled to an accounting of the unpaid
indebtedness and states the charge, if any, for an account; and
(E) states the time and place of a public sale or the time after
which any other disposition is to be made." 5
The statute does not require a "particular phrasing of the
notification,1l 6  and a notification "providing substantially the
information" is sufficient even if the notification includes additional
information or "minor errors that are not seriously misleading.""' 7 A
"safe harbor" form of notification is set forth in the statute." 8
114. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12. As of the writing of this article, there is no
Official Comment for Revised section 9-615(g). The author has suggested that the following be
added as Official Comment 7:
Subsection (g) addresses the question of whether a junior secured party who disposes
of collateral may retain and apply the proceeds to its secured debt or whether it is
obliged to turn over the proceeds to a senior secured party or lienholder. Courts
construing former Section 9-504 disagreed as to what was the proper rule. The senior
party's security interest or lien is not discharged under Section 9-617(a). This
subsection takes the position that the junior secured party may retain the proceeds free
of the senior's security interest or lien if it acts "in good faith and without knowledge
that the receipt violates the rights of the holder" of a senior secured party or other lien.
Under Section 9-610(c), the junior secured party is required to send an authenticated
notification of disposition to the holder of the senior interest. Mere knowledge of that
senior interest or the assertion by the holder of that interest that its rights would be
violated by the junior party's retention of the proceeds is not, in and of itself,
"knowledge that the receipt violates" the senior party's rights within the purview of
subsection (g). Additional facts or circumstances indicative of a violation of rights must
be known or made known to the junior secured party before it would be required to
turn over the proceeds to the senior secured party or lienholder.
115. R. § 9-613(1).
116. Id. § 9-613(4).
117. Id. § 9-613(3).
118. See id. § 9-613(5).
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For consumer-goods transactions,11 9 the rules are significantly
more stringent. The information described as being "sufficient" for
non-consumer-goods transactions 20  is mandatory, 12  and the
notification must also provide the following additional information:
(B) a description of any liability for a deficiency of the person to
which the notification is sent;
(C) a telephone number from which the amount that must be paid
to the secured party to redeem the collateral under Section
9-623 is available; and
(D) a telephone number or mailing address from which additional
information concerning the disposition and the obligation
secured is available. 122
The statute sets forth another "safe-harbor" form of
notification.1 23 Although there is an exception for errors,1 24 this
exception is more limited than in the case of non-consumer-goods
transactions.'22 It only applies to errors in additional nonmandatory
information in the notification and then only if "the error is [not]
misleading with respect to rights arising under this article.1 126 Thus,
there is no exception for errors in information required by the
statute.27 For example, if there was an error in the required telephone
number or mailing address, 128 the notification would not be sufficient
and the secured party would apparently be liable "for damages in the
amount of any loss caused by a failure to comply with this article. '' 129
Although actual damages may be unlikely, Revised Article 9
continues present law"30 in providing for minimum statutory damages
119. Revised Article 9 refers to both "consumer transactions" and "consumer-goods
transactions." The former, defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(26), includes the latter.
"Consumer transaction" means "a transaction in which (i) an individual incurs an obligation
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, (ii) a security interest secures the
obligation, and (iii) the collateral is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes." Id. § 9-102(a)(26). A "consumer-goods transaction" means "a consumer
transaction in which: (A) an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family or
household purposes; and (B) a security interest in consumer goods secures the obligation." Id.
§ 9-102(a)(24).
120. See supra text accompanying note 115.
121. See R. § 9-614(1)(A).
122- Id. § 9-614 (B)-(D).
123. See id. § 9-614(3).
124. See id. § 9-614(5).
125. See id. § 9-613(3)(B).
126. Id. § 9-614(5); see id. § 9-614 cmt. 3.
127. See id. § 9-614(1).
128. See id. § 9-614(1)(C)-(D).
129. Id. § 9-625(b).
130. See U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
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if the collateral is consumer goods. The debtor or a secondary obligor
"may recover for that failure in any event an amount not less than the
credit service charge plus 10 percent of the principal amount of the
obligation or the time-price differential plus 10 percent of the cash
price."131
Statutory damages can be substantial. Moreover, there is a
possibility that the error giving rise to the noncompliance could be a
wide-spread technologically caused error, e.g., one that results in the
omission or transposition of a digit in a telephone number or address.
Such an error could, in turn, give rise to a class action claim for
statutory damages.
That would be an unfortunate and irrational result. Although
most of the drafts of Revised Article 9 contained provisions based on
the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act 132 protecting against such draconian
consequences where there was a good faith error and limiting the
potential recovery in class actions, those provisions were scuttled at
the end of the drafting process as part of the "consumer
compromise."'33
B. Commercial Reasonableness
Even though Revised Article 9 contains new expanded and
detailed provisions governing the procedure for conducting
foreclosure sales, the requirement that "[e]very aspect of a disposition
of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place and other
terms, must be commercially reasonable"'13 4 continues to be critical.
Accordingly, "commercial reasonableness" remains a highly fact-
sensitive issue to be resolved by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
Revised Article 9, nevertheless, offers some insights as to how the
issue should be resolved.
1. Preparation of Collateral for Sale
The oft-litigated issue of whether a secured party has an
affirmative duty to process or prepare the collateral prior to sale is
131. R. § 9-625(c)(2). Note that this provision applies to any transaction, commercial or
consumer, where the collateral is "consumer goods"; i.e., it is not limited to consumer
transactions or consumer-goods transactions.
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B), (c) (1994).
133. See supra note 23; infra text accompanying notes 277-87.
134. R. § 9-610(b). This language is substantially identical to UCC section 9-504(3) quoted
supra text accompanying note 81.
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handled by an Official Comment:
[S]ubsection (a) does not grant the secured party the right to
dispose of the collateral "in its then condition" under all
circumstances. A secured party may not dispose of collateral "in its
then condition" when, taking into account the costs and probable
benefits of preparation or processing and the fact that the secured
party would be advancing the costs at its risk, it would be
commercially unreasonable to dispose of the collateral in that
condition.135
Accordingly, even though the secured party is not always under a
duty to incur the expense of preparing the collateral for sale, there
may be factual circumstances where the failure to do so would be
commercially unreasonable. In essence, this follows the trend of
judicial decisions'16 under present law and is consistent with common
sense.
2. Warranties
Relative to the issue of preparing the collateral for sale is the
matter of warranties. Revised Article 9 rejects the approach taken by
present law that warranties do not accompany a foreclosure sale. 137
Instead, it provides that the contract for sale on foreclosure "includes
135. R. § 9-610 cmt. 4.
136. See, e.g., Franklin State Bank v. Parker, 346 A.2d 632, 635 (N.J. Union County Ct.
1975) (failing to make minor repairs to car which would have generated a higher foreclosure
sale price was commercially unreasonable).
137. UCC section 2-312 comment 5 presently states:
Subsection (2) recognizes that sales by sheriffs, executors, foreclosing lienors and
persons similarly situated are so out of the ordinary commercial course that their
peculiar character is immediately apparent to the buyer and therefore no personal
obligation is imposed upon the seller who is purporting to sell only an unknown or
limited right. This subsection does not touch upon and leaves open all questions of
restitution arising in such cases, when a unique article so sold is reclaimed by a third
party as the rightful owner.
A conforming amendment to Revised Article 9 amends this Official Comment to read:
Subsection (2) recognizes that sales by sheriffs, executors, certain foreclosing lienors
and persons similarly situated may be so out of the ordinary commercial course that
their peculiar character is immediately apparent to the buyer and therefore no
personal obligation is imposed upon the seller who is purporting to sell only an
unknown or limited right. This subsection does not touch upon and leaves open all
questions of restitution arising in such cases, when a unique article so sold is reclaimed
by a third party as the rightful owner.
Foreclosure sales under Article 9 are another matter. Section 9-610 provides that a
disposition of collateral under that section includes warranties such as those imposed
by this section on a voluntary disposition of property of the kind involved.
Consequently, unless properly excluded under subsection (2) or under the special
provisions for exclusion in Section 9-610, a disposition under Section 9-610 of collateral
consisting of goods includes the warranties imposed by subsection (1) and, if
applicable, subsection (3).
R. § 2-312 cmt. 5.
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the warranties relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, and the
like which by operation of law accompany a voluntary disposition of
property of the kind subject to the contract. 138 These warranties may
be disclaimed by language indicating that "There is no warranty
relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment or the like in this
disposition" -or words of similar import.139 Furthermore, statutory or
other warranties such as the implied warranties of merchantability or
fitness may also apply to a sale or other disposition by the secured
party. This is dependent upon the particular factual circumstances
and is determined by non-Article 9 law, e.g., UCC Articles 2 and 2A.
That law would also determine whether and how such warranties
could be disclaimed. 140
This new focus on warranties will motivate secured parties to
adapt their usual foreclosure procedures and disclaim all possible
warranties to avoid potential liability. In some cases, however, doing
so requires caution because it may raise an issue of "commercial
reasonableness." For example, if the secured party is conducting a
public foreclosure sale of new automobiles, would it be commercially
reasonable for the automobiles to be sold without the customary
manufacturer's warranties that usually accompany the sale of new
cars? To provide these warranties, the secured party usually has to
incur the expense of servicing the automobiles ("prepping") to a
standard required by the manufacturer in order to receive those
warranties. Although these expenses can be added to the amount of
the secured obligation, the secured party will have to analyze whether
these expenses are likely to be cost effective in generating higher
sales proceeds rather than just "throwing good money after bad."
C. "Low Price" Sales or Dispositions
An extremely controversial issue has been whether the reference
to "terms" in the requirement for commercial reasonableness 141
138. R. § 9-610(d).
139. See id. § 9-610(f).
140. See id. § 9-610 cmt. 11. If the foreclosing secured party is a manufacturer or dealer of
collateral being sold, these warranties may well arise absent a disclaimer. See id. Whether these
warranties are made by a secured party that is a "captive finance company" affiliate of a
manufacturer or seller of the particular kind of collateral is an issue under present law and will
continue to be so. See U.C.C. § 2A-103 cmt. g (indicating that although a finance lessor does not
make such warranties, the question of whether a captive finance company can, in fact, be a
finance lessor is determined by the particular circumstances); see also Mercedes-Benz Credit
Corp. v. Lotito, 703 A.2d 288 (N.J. Super Ct. 1997) (holding captive finance company liable).
141. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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includes the "price" realized at the foreclosure sale, particularly if the
debtor asserts that the price was "too low." Present law is very
uncertain on this important issue and differs among the states.142 The
problem has been compounded by the interpretation and application
of the provision that: "[tihe fact that a better price could have been
obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from
that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish
that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner";
143
which appears in Revised Article 9 in substantially similar language:
The fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by a
collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance at a different
time or in a different method from that selected by the secured
party is not of itself sufficient to preclude the secured party from
establishing that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or
acceptance was made in a commercially reasonable manner. 44
Does that provision make "price" irrelevant for purposes of
determining whether the secured party has satisfied the requirement
of "commercial reasonableness," without, however, precluding an
inquiry into whether the "fair value" of the collateral has been
credited against the obligation for purposes of calculating a deficiency
claim? Or, does it mean that if the procedural requirements of
"commercial reasonableness" have been complied with, the price
received, no matter how low, is binding for all purposes, including the
establishment of a deficiency claim? 145
This was one of the most difficult and contentious issues
considered by the Article 9 Drafting Committee. It was resolved in
two ways. First, the Drafting Committee concluded that while a "low
price" is not itself an aspect of "commercial reasonableness," it may
be relevant to the determination of whether the statutory aspects'
46
have been met. Two Official Comments contain the following
statement: "While not itself sufficient to establish a violation of this
Part, a low price suggests that a court should scrutinize carefully all
aspects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially
reasonable.' 1 47 Second, the Drafting Committee confronted the
problem of deficiency claims based upon alleged low prices and
142. See Rapson, supra note 1, at 493-96.
143. U.C.C. § 9-507(2).
144. R. § 9-627(a).
145. See Rapson, supra note 1, at 501.
146. These "aspects" would include "the method, manner, time, place and other terms." R.
§ 9-610(b).
147. Id. §§ 9-610 cmt. 10, 9-627 cmt. 2.
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developed a compromise solution 148 covering those circumstances
where the problem is most likely to arise, i.e., the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale is "the secured party, a person related to the secured
party, or a secondary obligor.' 149 The rationale is that these persons
do not have the economic incentive, in the absence of genuine
competitive bidding by independent third parties, to bid for the
collateral at prices that approximate the value of the collateral. 50
Indeed, the incentive is to the contrary: the lower the bid, the greater
the deficiency claim against the debtor.15 1
Revised Article 9 adds a new rule:
[Calculation of surplus or deficiency in disposition to person
related to secured party.] The surplus or deficiency following a
disposition is calculated based on the amount of proceeds that
would have been realized in a disposition complying with the
requirements of this part to a transferee other than the secured
party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor
if:
(1) the transferee in the disposition is the secured party, a
person related to the secured party, or a secondary
obligor; and
(2) the amount of proceeds of the disposition is significantly
below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition
to a person other than the secured party, a person related
to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have
brought.15 2
It is important to understand that this provision is operative and
governs the calculation of the deficiency claim even though the
foreclosure sale or disposition satisfies the procedural requirements
of "commercial reasonableness.' 153 In order for the debtor or obligor
148. See Rapson, supra note 1, at 532-36. The statutory formulation embodying the
compromise was subsequently changed (but not in substantive principle) and now appears at
Revised section 9-615(f). See infra text accompanying note 152.
149. R. § 9-615(f).
150. This is obvious when the purchaser is the secured party or "a person related to" the
secured party which includes an affiliate. See id. §§ 9-102(a)(63)(A), 9-102 cmt. 22, 9-615 cmt. 7.
151. In the case of a secondary obligor, there is an incentive to bid less than the value of the
collateral. Even though it, too, will be liable for a larger deficiency, if the secondary obligor pays
that deficiency it has reimbursement and restitution rights and the right to be subrogated to the
secured party's deficiency claim against the debtor or obligor, i.e., the principal obligor. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY §§ 22, 27 (1995). Moreover, if the
secondary obligor then becomes the owner of the collateral for less than the value of the
collateral, it can reduce its costs by re-selling the collateral for a profit. As previously noted, the
value of that right of subrogation depends upon the financial circumstances of the debtor or
obligor. See supra note 96.
152. R. § 9-615(f).
153. See id. § 9-615 cmt. 6; see also id. §§ 9-610 cmt. 10, 9-627 cmt. 2.
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to avail itself of the statutory protection in a non-consumer
transaction, it has the burden of establishing that the foreclosure sale
price "is significantly below the range of prices that a complying
disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related
to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought,"' 54
i.e., what an independent third party would have bid at a
commercially reasonable sale. Consequently, the effect upon the
amount of the deficiency claim is exactly the same as would result
under the "rebuttable presumption" rule if the sale had not complied
with the requirements of commercial reasonableness,'55 in which case
the burden shifts to the secured party. In that circumstance, the
secured party is still entitled to recover a deficiency, but it is
calculated on "the amount of proceeds that would have been realized
had the noncomplying secured party proceeded in accordance with
the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement,
disposition, or acceptance.' ' 56 As a practical matter, this results in the
secured party having the burden of establishing that an independent
third party would have bid an amount less than the amount of the
obligation at a commercially reasonable sale. 57 Thus, the inquiry in
both cases is "What would an independent third party have paid for
the collateral?"
This new provision for calculating deficiencies affords significant
protection to debtors and obligors against abusive claims. Consumer
advocates, in particular, have stressed their concern about deficiency
claims. 58 In response to this concern, Revised Article 9 provides an
additional protection in a consumer-goods transaction by requiring
the secured party to send the debtor and any consumer obligor an
explanation of "how the secured party calculated the surplus or
deficiency,"' 5 9 including the "aggregate amount of obligations," the
"amount of the proceeds of the disposition," the "amount ... of
expenses," and the "amount ... of credits, including rebates of
154. Id. § 9-626(a)(5); see id. § 9-626 cmt. 5. In a consumer transaction, the determination of
the proper rule imposing the burden of proof is left to the court. See id. § 9-626(b). This is
another element of the "consumer compromise." See supra note 23; infra text accompanying
notes 277-87.
155. See R. § 9-626(a)(3); infra text accompanying notes 272-76.
156. R. § 9-626(a)(3)(B); see infra text accompanying notes 270-76.
157. See R. § 9-626 cmt. 3. Although the statute here does not expressly require proof
concerning a hypothetical sale to a third person, the easiest and most efficient way for the
secured party to make its proofs is to provide testimony as to such a sale.
15& See supra text accompanying note 6.
159. R. § 9-616(a)(1)(B).
[Vol. 74:893
DEFA UL TAND ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS
interest."'16 The secured party must send this explanation within
fourteen days after receiving a request and "before or when the
secured party accounts to the debtor and pays any surplus or first
makes written demand on the consumer obligor after the disposition
for payment of the deficiency."''1 This means that a consumer debtor
or secondary obligor can receive an explanation of how a deficiency
was calculated without having to "wait until the secured party
commences written collection efforts.' 1 62 If, however, the secured
party does not receive such a demand and makes no "attempt to
collect a deficiency in writing or account for and pay a surplus [it] has
no obligation to send an explanation."1 63
This right to receive an explanation of how a deficiency claim
was calculated enables a consumer obligor to make an early and
informed decision as to whether to challenge that claim. Under
present law, there is no requirement for an explanation and, although
some secured parties give one as a matter of good business practice,
many do not.164 The imposition of this requirement will hopefully
motivate secured parties to exercise more care, caution, and fairness
in the manner in which they conduct foreclosure sales and attempt to
pursue deficiency claims.
The statutory sanctions for not complying with this requirement
are relatively mild-recovery of any loss plus $500 if there is a failure
to send an explanation in response to a request. 65 There is no liability,
however, for statutory damages. 66 The secured party must also pay
$500 if the failure to send an explanation prior to the time it
''accounts to the debtor and pays any surplus or first makes a written
demand on the consumer obligor after the disposition for payment of
the deficiency"' 67 is "part of a pattern, or consistent with a practice, of
noncompliance."' 68 Although neither the statute nor the Official
Comments speak to the particular point, if the facts demonstrate this
or any other pattern or practice of noncompliance by the secured
party, there may well be additional risks. A secured party who
160. Id. § 9-616(c).
161. Id. § 9-616(b)(1)(A)-(B).
162. Id. § 9-616 cmt. 2.
163. Id.
164. Some consumer creditors strongly opposed this requirement on the ground of added
cost.
165. See R. § 9-625(b), (c)(1), (e)(6).
166. See R. § 9-628(d); supra text accompanying notes 119-33.
167. R. § 9-616(b)(1)(A).
168. Id. § 9-625(e)(5); see id. § 9-616 cmt. 4.
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engages in a practice or pattern of noncompliance could be subject to
claims for injunctive or other equitable relief 169 and liable for damages
under "principles of law and equity" supplemental to Article 9,170 such
as conversion or fraud based on misconduct. This, in turn, could lead
to claims for punitive damages and to class actions. This new
requirement for an explanation and the express statutory concern
with a pattern or practice of noncompliance, together with the
''consumer compromise" decision "to leave to the court the
determination of the proper rules in consumer transactions '17' may
increase those risks.
D. Application of Noncash Proceeds
Frequently the foreclosing secured party "finances" the
acquisition of the collateral by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
Credit terms are extended to the purchaser secured by the purchased
collateral. The issue that then arises is much the same as previously
discussed.172 Must the secured party credit the original debtor with the
full purchase price (discounted to present value) or, if that price is not
readily determinable, with the value of the purchased collateral, i.e.,
the "noncash proceeds"? Or can it wait until it receives cash proceeds
from the new debtor's required payments? As before,' 73 the rule is
that the "secured party need not apply or pay over for application
noncash proceeds ... unless the failure to do so would be
commercially unreasonable.1' 74 Here, however, it will often be
commercially unreasonable for the secured party not to do so,
particularly if the noncash proceeds "are of the type that the secured
party regularly generates in the ordinary course of its financing
business in nonforeclosure transactions."'75 Thus, if the secured party
169. See id. § 9-625(a).
170. See U.C.C. § 1-103; see also id. § 1-106 (providing for the liberal administration of
remedies). Although Revised section 9-625(b) provides for a claim for damages "caused by a
failure to comply with this article" that provision is most likely directed to a particular
transaction as distinguished from widespread patterns or practices of noncompliance, which
arguably give rise to claims outside of Article 9. See R. § 9-625 cmt. 3 (noting that "principles of
tort law supplement this subsection"). Inasmuch as Revised Article 9 does not mention punitive
damages, they cannot be imposed unless allowed under such supplemental law. See U.C.C.
§ 1-106(1).
171. R. § 9-626(b); see supra note 23; supra text accompanying notes 119-33; infra text
accompanying notes 277-87.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78 (discussing Revised section 9-608(a)(3)).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
174. R. § 9-615(c).
175. Id. § 9-615 cmt. 3.
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is in the business of financing the acquisition of goods on a secured
credit basis, the original debtor should not have to bear the risk of the
secured party's credit judgment with respect to the new debtor. On
the other hand, if the terms and structure of the purchase of collateral
are out of the ordinary and the noncash proceeds are such that a
"purchase price" or value of the purchase is not readily determinable,
it may be commercially reasonable to credit the original debtor only
as and when cash proceeds are paid by the new debtor.
III. ACCEPTANCE OF COLLATERAL IN FULL OR PARTIAL
SATISFACTION OF OBLIGATION: "STRICT FORECLOSURE"
This third method of enforcement, sometimes called "strict
foreclosure," is significantly changed and expanded under Revised
Article 9.176 As a consequence, strict foreclosure should be used much
more extensively than it has been under present law. It provides a
method of enforcement that is nonadversarial, requires lower
transaction costs, and is not likely to result in litigation. Revised
Article 9 permits the parties to enter into an agreement for the
voluntary turnover of the collateral to the secured party in return for
an agreed-upon credit against the debt, with the debtor
acknowledging its liability for the remaining deficiency. Present
Article 9 makes no provision for acceptance of the collateral in partial
satisfaction of the obligation. 17
Present law permits acceptance of the collateral only in full
satisfaction I7 8 of the obligation. That limitation is conceptually
consistent with traditional common law strict foreclosure. According
to Professor Gilmore, the original draftsman of Article 9, "[t]he land
mortgagee's right to a decree of strict foreclosure and the common
law conditional seller's right to forfeit the buyer's equity on retaking
of the goods (which automatically barred the seller's claim for the
unpaid balance of the price) were both illustrations of this
approach.'1 79 Furthermore, the remedy under present Article 9 can
only be exercised if the secured party is in possession of the
collateral'180-which means that the remedy is not applicable to
intangible collateral, e.g., accounts.
176. See id. §§ 9-620 to 9-622.
177. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2).
178. See id.
179. 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.3, at 1220.
180. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2).
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It is arguable that an agreement for a turnover of the property in
partial satisfaction of the obligation with a resultant deficiency
liability is permissible under the UCC's "freedom of contract"
provision. 81 On the other hand, establishment of a deficiency by
agreement rather than by a "commercially reasonable" sale or
disposition may, in effect, be an impermissible disclaimer of "the
obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care" 182
required for enforcement by nonjudicial foreclosure. 18' Furthermore,
the strict foreclosure rules in real estate mortgage law and the
analogous provision for discharge of the obligation in the predecessor
Uniform Conditional Sales Act' 84 made no provision for partial
satisfaction with a resulting deficiency. Those rules are directly
traceable' 85 to common law strict foreclosure, which did not permit
deficiency claims.' 16
Revised Article 9 thus effectuates a major change in present law
by providing for partial satisfaction in addition to full satisfaction 8
except that acceptance of collateral as partial satisfaction is not
permitted in a consumer transaction. 88 In addition, unless the
collateral is consumer goods,1 89 there is no longer a requirement that
the secured party have possession of the collateral, thereby permitting
use of strict foreclosure for intangible collateral. 90 Unlike the
enforcement remedies of collection'9' and nonjudicial foreclosure, 192
the remedy of acceptance in full or partial satisfaction of the
181. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
182. Id.
183. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3). The response would be that the agreement constitutes a
reasonable determination of "the standards by which the performance of such obligation is to be
measured" within the purview of UCC section 1-102(3).
184. See UNIF. CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 23,2 U.L.A. 36 (1922).
185. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.3, at 1221.
186. This procedure is not permitted in the case of consumer goods if the debtor has paid
60% of the price or obligation, unless the debtor waives its rights after default. See U.C.C.
§ 9-505(1). This provision assumes that in those circumstances the debtor "thus has a substantial
equity" which merits protection. See id. § 9-505 cmt. 1. In that circumstance, the secured party
"must dispose" of the collateral under the foreclosure procedure unless that requirement is
waived after default. See id. § 9-505(1). There is a similar "60% rule" in Revised Article 9. See
R. §§ 9-620(a)(4), (e)-(f), 9-624(b). The secured party is required to dispose of the collateral
within 90 days of taking possession or "any longer period to which the debtor and all secondary
obligors have agreed." Id. § 9-620(f).
187. See R. § 9-620(a).
188. See id. § 9-620(g).
189. See id. § 9-620(a)(3).
190. See id. § 9-620 cmt. 7.
191. See id. §§ 9-607 to 9-608.
192. See id. §§ 9-610 to 9-614.
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obligation is not subject to a requirement of "commercial
reasonableness," but it must be done in "good faith.' 193
The procedural requirements set forth in the statute are complex
and need close study. First, the debtor must consent to the
acceptance.194 Consent to a full or partial satisfaction of the obligation
can always be manifested "if the debtor agrees to the terms of the
acceptance in a record authenticated after default."'195 Such an
agreement is the only method of consent permitted for a partial
satisfaction. 96 There is an additional method of consent by inaction
permitted only for a full satisfaction: the secured party can send the
debtor a proposal for acceptance in full satisfaction after default and,
if it does not receive a notification of objection authenticated by the
debtor within twenty days after the proposal is sent, the debtor's
silence constitutes consent. 197 The second condition is that the secured
party not receive a notification of objection to the proposal 98 from
certain prescribed persons to whom it must first send the proposal' 99
or from "any other person, other than the debtor, holding an interest
in the collateral subordinate to the security interest that is the subject
of the proposal. ' 200
There cannot be an effective acceptance of the collateral without
the secured party's consent. This "consent" can be manifested either
in an authenticated record of agreement or by the act of sending the
proposal to the debtor.201 This provision has the effect of rejecting the
line of cases under present law finding a "constructive" strict
foreclosure because of the secured party's delay or inaction following
repossession of the collateral.202 Instead, "delay is a factor relating to
whether the secured party acted in a commercially reasonable
manner" in exercising its remedies under the collection or nonjudicial
foreclosure provisions. 203 Moreover, a "debtor's voluntary surrender
193. See id. § 9-621 cmt. 2; see also U.C.C. § 1-203 (setting forth the obligation of good
faith).
194. See R. § 9-620(a)(1).
195. Id. § 9-620(c)(1)-(2).
196. See id. § 9-620(c)(1).
197. See id. § 9-620(c)(2).
198. See id. § 9-620(a)(2).
199. See id. § 9-620(a)(2)(A); see also id. § 9-621.
200. Id. § 9-620(a)(2)(B).
201. See id. § 9-620(b)(1).
202. See id. § 9-620 cmt. 5; see also Barb's Sprinklers, Inc. v. Water Boy Lawn Sprinkler's,
Inc., 686 So. 2d 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Comer v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 858 P.2d
560 (Wyo. 1993); Zinnecker, supra note 7, at 1772-75.
203. See R. § 9-620 cmt. 5; see also id. §§ 9-607, 9-610.
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of collateral to a secured party and the secured party's acceptance of
possession of the collateral does not, of itself, necessarily raise an
implication that the secured party intends or is proposing to accept
the collateral in satisfaction of the secured obligation. ''2°4
The requirements for sending notification of the proposal25 are
substantially similar to those for sending notice of nonjudicial
foreclosure.20 6 The proposal must be sent to "any person from which
the secured party has received, before the debtor consented to the
acceptance, an authenticated notification of a claim of an interest in
the collateral. '207 In addition, it must be sent to "any other secured
party or lienholder [including a senior secured party] that, 10 days
before the debtor consented to the acceptance, held a security
interest in or other lien on the collateral perfected by the filing of a
financing statement" 20 8  or perfected by complying with the
requirements of other applicable law such as a certificate of title
law.209 Furthermore, if the proposal is to accept collateral in partial
satisfaction of the obligation, the proposal must be sent to any
secondary obligor.210 If any of those persons object to the proposal,
the secured party must receive notification of the objection from that
person within a limited period of time, e.g., within twenty days after
notification of the proposal was sent to the objector.21' A timely
objection "prevents an acceptance of collateral from taking effect, '212
necessitating that the secured party resort to either collection213 or
nonjudicial foreclosure as the means of enforcement.2 14
204. Id. § 9-620 cmt. 5.
205. See id. § 9-621.
206. See id. § 9-611; supra text accompanying notes 87-114. There is no "safe-harbor,"
however, protecting the secured party against the risk of no response to its request for a UCC
search from the filing office or a search that is not current. Cf R. § 9-611(e); supra text
accompanying notes 102-05. The reason for the difference is that because the secured party is
not subject to the commercial reasonableness requirement in this circumstance, protection from
the risk of filing office error and delay is not needed. See R. §§ 9-622(a)(3), 9-621 cmt. 2.
Although subordinate security interests and liens are discharged even if not notified, see id.
§ 9-622(b), a non-notified subordinate party has the right to recover damages for any resulting
loss, e.g., its "equity" in the collateral. See id. §§ 9-622 cmt. 2, 9-625(b).
207. R. § 9-621(a)(1).
208. Id. § 9-621(a)(2)
209. See id. § 9-621(a)(3).
210. See id. § 9-621(b). Unless the secondary obligor objects, it will be liable for the
deficiency resulting from the agreement.
211. See id. § 9-620(d).
212. Id. § 9-620 cmt. 8.
213. See id. § 9-607.
214. See id. § 9-610. The secured party could, of course, foreclose judicially in a proceeding
approved by the court. See id. § 9-627(c)(1).
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Finally, Revised Article 9 cures a curious omission in the present
law by setting forth the effect of an acceptance of collateral:
(a) [Effect of acceptance.] A secured party's acceptance of
collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it
secures:
(1) discharges the obligation to the extent consented to by the
debtor;
(2) transfers to the secured party all of a debtor's rights in the
collateral;
(3) discharges the security interest or agricultural lien that is
the subject of the debtor's consent and any subordinate
security interest or other subordinate lien; and
(4) terminates any other subordinate interest.
(b) [Discharge of subordinate interest notwithstanding noncompli-
ance.] A subordinate interest is discharged or terminated
under subsection (a), even if the secured party fails to comply
with this article.2 15
This new remedy of permitting an agreement with a debtor for
the acceptance of collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation is
one that secured parties should consider using on a regular basis. The
secured party must be willing to offer the obligor a fair credit against
the obligation. If offered in good faith, the debtor, secondary obligor,
and junior secured parties and lienholders will have little motivation
to insist upon a foreclosure sale with its attendant delay, expense, and
uncertainty of result. There will then be no basis for a dispute about
"commercial reasonableness." Revised Article 9 has made an
important and useful change in making this a meaningful
enforcement right and remedy.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF LEASES AND LICENSES
Earlier in this article it was noted that although a secured party
may have enforcement rights against a person who is an account
debtor or a person who is obligated on collateral, provisions of
Revised Article 9 or other law determine whether that person owes
215. Id. § 9-622. Although UCC section 9-505(2) contains no such provision, it is reasonable
to assume that acceptance in full satisfaction of the obligation has the same effect as a
nonjudicial foreclosure. See U.C.C. § 9-504(4). According to Professor Gilmore:
The junior security interests and liens are discharged. It is true that § 9-504(4) makes
an express statement about the point and that § 9-505(2) does not. But "retention"
under § 9-505 and "disposition" under § 9-504 are merely alternative ways of
liquidating the transaction between the foreclosing secured party and the debtor; they
should have the same effect on competing interests.
2 GILMORE, supra note 2, § 44.3, at 1225.
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any duty to the secured party.26 That point has particular importance
in the context of enforcing obligations owed under lease agreements,
e.g., equipment leases, and license agreements, e.g., licenses of
software. 21 7
Upon default of the debtor, the secured party wants the account
debtor to render performance of its obligations to the secured party
or to a person to whom the secured party may, on foreclosure, sell the
rights under the agreement. In the case of a lease or license, if the
lessor or licensor grants a security interest in its rights under the lease
or license agreement, the lessor or licensor is the debtor and the
lessee or licensee, as the case may be, is the account debtor.218 The
security interest, in essence, is in the right to receive payments, i.e., an
account, and, upon default, the secured party will seek to enforce and
collect that payment or to foreclose and sell that right to a third party.
Generally, the lessee or licensee would not object to making payment
to the secured party or to the third party unless it is entitled to receive
a return performance from the lessor or licensor that would somehow
be jeopardized. 219 In order to avoid that risk, the lessee or licensee
may negotiate for a contractual term in the lease or license
prohibiting the granting or enforcement by the other party of a
security interest without its consent, or making such granting or
enforcement an event of default.
If the lessee or licensee grants a security interest in its rights
under the lease or license agreement, i.e., a general intangible, that
person is then the debtor and the lessor or licensor, as the case may
216. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35, 43. This point is emphasized in an Official
Comment: "Neither this section [R § 9-607] nor former Section 9-502 should be understood to
regulate the duties of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral" R. § 9-607 cmt.
6.
217. A security interest in a "nonexclusive license of software" is a security interest in a
general intangible. See R. § 9-408 cmt. 2.
218. See id. § 9-408 cmt. 5.
219. See U.C.C. § 2A-303 cmt. 5 ("[I]t is not likely that a transfer by the lessor of its right to
payment under the lease contract would impair at a future time the ability of the lessee to
obtain the performance due the lessee."). Although that statement in the Official Comments
does not appear as a consequence of UCC section 2A-303(3) being replaced by Revised section
9-407 and the companion amendments to UCC section 2A-303 and the Official Comments
thereto, it re-appears in proposed Revised Article 2A. See U.C.C. § 2A-403 cmt. 5 (Final Draft
1999). At its annual meeting in July 1999, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") took no action with respect to proposed revisions to Articles
2 and 2A. On August 18, 1999, NCCUSL and the American Law Institute jointly announced
"the formation of a new Drafting Committee to continue the effort to revise Article 2 (Sales)
and 2A (Leases) of the UCC." See ALl and NCCUSL Announce New Drafting Committee for
UCC Articles 2 and 2A (press release dated Aug. 18, 1999) (on file with author).
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be, is the account debtor. 220 In the event of a default, the secured
party may, itself, want to use the leased property or license or may
choose to sell the right to that property or license to a third party. The
lessor or licensor, however, is likely to object to anyone else using or
having possession of the property or license. 221 Accordingly, the lessor
or licensor often insists upon a contractual term prohibiting the
granting or enforcement of a security interest by the other party
without its consent or making such granting or enforcement an event
of default.
The effect and enforceability of terms in lease and license
agreements prohibiting the granting or enforcement of security
interests or making such granting or enforcement events of default is
a critical issue in secured financing. Furthermore, if there is no term
prohibiting the granting or enforcement of a security interest in rights
under the lease or license agreement there may, nevertheless, be
circumstances where the grant or enforcement of a security interest
constitutes an assignment or transfer which "materially impairs the
prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially changes the
duty of, or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on" the
other party, entitling that party to some form of relief.222
These matters came to the forefront in 1988 in connection with
the promulgation of Article 2A-Leases 223 and in the recent drafting of
Revised Article 9 and the parallel drafting of former proposed Article
220. See R. § 9-408 cmt. 5, example 2.
221. A licensor, particularly in the case of software, has an important protection-worthy
intellectual property interest in the license.
222. U.C.C. § 2A-303(3)-(5); see U.C.C. § 2-210(2). This is a codification of the common law
"material impairment" rule.
223. UCC section 2A-303(1)(a) originally made enforceable a provision in a lease contract
which prohibited a transfer. That provision would have precluded a party from granting a
security interest in a lease agreement, including the sale of the lease agreement, without the
consent of the other party. Professor Steven L. Harris drew attention to this problem in Steven
L. Harris, The Rights of Creditors Under Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 803, 829-54 (1988). As a
consequence, UCC section 2A-303 was amended as part of the 1990 amendments to Article 2A.
The Official Comment described the "Changes" as follows:
The provisions of Sections 2-210 and 9-311 were incorporated in this section, with
substantial modifications to reflect leasing terminology and practice and to harmonize
the principles of the respective provision, i.e., limitations on delegation of performance
on the one hand and alienability of rights on the other. In addition, unlike Section
2-210 which deals only with voluntary transfers, this section deals with involuntary as
well as voluntary transfers. Moreover, the principle of Section 9-318(4) denying
effectiveness to contractual terms prohibiting assignments of receivables due and to
become due also is implemented.
U.C.C. § 2A-303, Changes. Professor Harris is one of the Co-Reporters for Revised Article 9.
Professor Charles Mooney is the other Co-Reporter.
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2B-Licenses.224 In both instances, the focus was on the conflicting
policies on assignment and alienability: free alienability of rights,
manifested by UCC section 9-318(4)225 which generally renders
unenforceable a term in an agreement that prohibits the creation or
enforcement of a security interest or makes either action an event of
default; and freedom of contract, which gives one party to a contract
the right to protect itself against an actual delegation of a material
performance by the other party, complemented by the common law
material impairment rule and its codification in UCC section
2-210(2),226 permitting an assignment of all rights unless there is such a
material impairment.227
A. Leases
Article 2A harmonized these conflicting policies by providing
that a contractual term in a lease agreement prohibiting the creation
or enforcement of a security interest or making such actions events of
default
is not enforceable unless, and then only to the extent that, there is
[1] an actual transfer by the lessee of the lessee's right of possession
or use of goods in violation of the provision or [2] an actual
delegation of a material performance of either party to the lease
contract in violation of the provision.228
Likewise, if there is no contractual prohibition, the granting or
enforcement of a security interest by the lessor does not violate the
material impairment rule229 "unless, and then only to the extent that,
there is an actual delegation of a material performance of the
224. On April 7, 1999, the NCCUSL and the American Law Institute jointly "announced
that legal rules for computer information transactions will not be promulgated as Article 2B of
the Uniform Commercial Code, but the Conference will promulgate the rules for adoption by
states as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act." See National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws & American Law Institute, NCCUSL to Promulgate
Freestanding Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act: ALl and NCCUSL Announce
That Legal Rules for Computer Information Will Not Be Part of UCC (undated press release)
(on file with author). In any event, there is no longer a conflict. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO.
TRANSACTIONS AcT § 103(c)(3) (Final Draft 1999) ("To the extent of a conflict between this
[Act] and [Article 9], [Article 9] governs.").
225. UCC section 9-318(4) has been replaced by Revised section 9-406(d).
226. See U.C.C. § 2-210(2).
227. See supra text accompanying note 222.
228. U.C.C. § 2A-303(3) (emphasis added). UCC section 2A-303(3) has been replaced by
Revised section 9-407. See infra text accompanying notes 232-46. There is no substantive
change.
229. See supra text accompanying note 222.
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lessor."2 30 These rules are continued and re-stated in Revised Article
9.231
1. Enforcement Against Lessee
Under Revised Article 9, enforcement of a security interest
granted by the lessee in its rights under the lease agreement is not a
problem unless:
1. There is a contractual term in the lease prohibiting
enforcement of the security interest and either:
a. a transfer of "the lessee's right of possession or use of the
goods in violation of the term";232 or
b. "a delegation of a material performance of [the lessee] in
violation of the term";233 or
2. Even if there is no such term, there is a transfer in violation
of the material impairment rule.234
If any of those circumstances occur, the lessor can exercise its rights in
the lease agreement governing default, including cancellation of the
lease.235 If the lease agreement is silent but there is, nevertheless, a
material impairment, the lessor can recover damages from the lessee
and obtain appropriate judicial relief, "including cancellation of the
lease contract or an injunction against the transfer."23 6
The practical effect is that the secured party cannot enforce its
security interest by foreclosing and selling the lessee's most important
rights under the lease, i.e., to possess and use the goods without first
obtaining the consent of the lessor. This is reasonable and does not
seem to have imposed a difficult burden on secured financing.
2. Enforcement Against Lessor
Enforcement of a security interest granted by the lessor in its
interests under the lease agreement or in its residual interest is not a
problem unless:
1. There is a contractual term in the lease agreement
prohibiting enforcement of the security interest and a
230. U.C.C. § 2A-303(3).
231. See R. § 9-407.
232. Id. § 9-407(b)(1).
233. Id. § 9-407(b)(2).
234. See id. § 9-407(c).
235. See R. § 2A-303(4) (presently U.C.C. §§ 2A-303(5), 2A-501(2), 2A-523).
236. Id. § 2A-303(4)(b) (presently U.C.C. § 2A-303(5)(b)).
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"delegation of a material performance" of the lessor;237 or
2. Even if there is no such term, there is a transfer in violation
of the material impairment rule "and then only to the extent
that, enforcement actually results in a delegation of material
performance of the lessor. '238
Thus, the crucial question in both circumstances is whether there is a
"delegation of material performance" of the lessor. When might that
happen?
Initially, it needs to be determined whether the "lessor, in fact,
has any remaining obligations to perform. '23 9 If it does not, there is no
problem. "If it does, it is then necessary to determine whether there
has been an actual delegation of 'material performance.'' ' 24° The
Official Comments to UCC section 2A-303 provide important
guidance and state that in order for there to be "remaining
performance," there has to be "an affirmative duty to render
stipulated performance" and that "it is instructive to focus on the
difference between 'operating' and 'non-operating' leases as generally
understood in the marketplace. ' 241 This Official Comment gives as an
example the circumstance where there has been a transfer of
ownership of an airplane which prevents the lessee from continuing to
operate the airplane. 242
If there has been such a "delegation of material performance" of
the lessor in violation of a contractual term, the lessee can then
exercise its rights under the lease agreement, including cancellation of
the lease.243 If the lease agreement is silent, but there is, nevertheless,
such a delegation, the lessee can recover damages from the lessor and
obtain appropriate judicial relief, "including cancellation of the lease
contract or an injunction against the transfer."'2- The practical effect
is that a secured party seeking to enforce its security interest in the
lessor's interest under the lease agreement or in its residual interest
has to exercise caution in exercising collection rights against the
237. See R. § 9-407(a), (b)(2).
238. Id. § 9-407(c).
239. Id. § 9-407 cmt. 3.
240. Id.
241. R. § 2A-303 cmt. 3 (presently U.C.C. § 2A-303 cmt. 7); see id. § 2A-303 cmt. 4
(presently U.C.C. § 2A-303 cmt. 8).
242. See id. § 2A-303 cmt. 4 (presently U.C.C. § 2A-303 cmt. 8). For example, under 49
U.S.C. §§ 44101, 44102 (1994), the lessee can only operate an airplane in the United States that
is owned by a person satisfying certain citizenship or corporate qualifications.
243. See R. § 2A-303(4) (presently U.C.C. §§ 2A-303(5), 2A-501(2), 2A-508).
244. Id. § 2A-303(4)(b) (presently U.C.C. § 2A-303(5)(b)).
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lessee 245 or foreclosing and selling the lessor's interest under the
lease.246 The secured party must analyze the effect of such
enforcement upon the lessee in terms of whether there will be a
"delegation of material performance" of the lessor. Good practice
would mandate that such an analysis be made by the secured party
before entering into the secured transaction with the lessor-the
critical inquiry being "whether and how the secured party will be able
to enforce its security interest if the lessor defaults."
B. Licenses
In the case of licenses, there has also been a harmonization of the
conflicting policies on alienability and assignment 247 but it takes a
somewhat different approach than what was done with respect to
leases. Here, the debate centered on the position principally
advanced by licensors of software 248 that contractual terms prohibiting
the granting of security interests in license agreements or making such
granting or enforcement events of default should be enforceable. In
addition, the software licensors urged that even in the absence of such
a contractual term, the granting or enforcement of a security interest
should be subject to the material impairment rule.2 49 These licensors
were extremely concerned about protecting their intellectual property
rights in the license and viewed any granting or enforcement of a
security interest with respect to the license agreement as a serious
threat to those rights, whether the security interest was granted by the
licensor or licensee. For several years, drafts of proposed Article 2B
supported the position advanced by the software licensors 0 Revised
Article 9 resolves the issue in a conceptually simple and straightfor-
ward manner.
In the case of a security interest granted by the licensor in its
right to receive payments under the license-an "account"E51-any
contractual term or "rule of law, statute, or regulation" (such as the
245. See R. § 9-607.
246. See id. § 9-610.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 223-27.
248. Although this article focuses on software licenses, the analysis is applicable to other
general intangibles "including a contract, permit, license, or franchise." R. § 9-408(a), (c). For an
extended discussion of this debate, see Steven 0. Weise, The Financing of Intellectual Property
Under Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1077 (1999).
249. See supra text accompanying note 222.
250. See U.C.C. §§ 2B-502 to 2B-503 (ALI Council Draft No. 3, Dec. 1, 1997).
251. See R. §§ 9-102(a)(2), 9-408 cmt. 5, example 2.
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material impairment rule2) which prohibits or restricts the creation,
attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in that
right to payment or makes such creation, attachment, perfection, or
enforcement an event of default or gives the licensee a claim, right of
termination, or remedy, is ineffective. 253 Free alienability governs as in
the case of any account.
A security interest in the licensee's rights under the lease
agreement-a "general intangible"E54-is treated differently and
affords significant protections to licensors against enforcement. In
essence, a contractual term prohibiting the "creation, attachment, or
perfection of a security interest" in the licensee's rights or making
such creation, attachment, or perfection an event of default or giving
the licensor a claim, right of termination, or remedy is also
ineffective.215 Likewise ineffective is a "rule of law, statute, or
regulation" (including the material impairment rule256) which
prohibits or restricts the creation, attachment, or perfection of a
security interest in the licensee's rights under the license agreement
or makes such creation, attachment, or perfection an event of default
or gives the licensor a claim, right of termination, or remedy.257
Enforcement, however, is a different matter. Here, Revised
Article 9 gives way to law other than Revised Article 9, if any, that
252. See supra text accompanying note 222.
253. See R. § 9-406(d), (f).
254. See id. § 9-408 cmt. 2.
255. See id. § 9-408(a). Revised section 9-408(a) provides in pertinent part:
[Term restricting assignment generally ineffective.]
[A] term in ... an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which relates to
a ... general intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise, and which
term prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of ... the account debtor to, the
assignment or transfer of, or creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest
in, the.., general intangible, is ineffective to the extent that the term:
(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest
may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense,
termination, right of termination, or remedy under the ... general intangible.
256. See supra text accompanying note 222.
257. See R. § 9-408(c). Revised section 9-408(c) provides in pertinent part:
[Legal restrictions on assignment generally ineffective.] A rule of law, statute, or
regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a government,
governmental body or official, ... or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of,
or creation of a security interest in, a ... general intangible, including a contract,
permit, license, or franchise between an account debtor and a debtor, is ineffective to
the extent that the rule of law, statute, or regulation:
(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest
may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense,
termination, right of termination, or remedy under the.., general intangible.
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makes such contractual terms or legal rules effective. It provides in
pertinent part:28
[Limitation on ineffectiveness under subsections (a) and (c).] To
the extent that a term in ... an agreement between an account
debtor and a debtor which relates to a ... general intangible or a
rule of law, statute, or regulation described in subsection (c) would
be effective under law other than this article but is ineffective under
subsection (a) or (c), the creation, attachment, or perfection of a
security interest in the... general intangible:
(1) is not enforceable against the ... account debtor;
(2) does not impose a duty or obligation on the.., account debtor;
(3) does not require the ... account debtor to recognize the
security interest, pay or render performance to the secured
party, or accept payment or performance from the secured
party;
(4) does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor's
rights under the ... general intangible, including any related
information or materials furnished to the debtor in the
transaction giving rise to the ... general intangible;
(5) does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or
have access to any trade secrets or confidential information of
the.., account debtor; and
(6) does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security
interest in the.., general intangible 5 9
Accordingly, even though a secured party may take and perfect a
security interest in the rights of a licensee under a license agreement,
the secured party's right to enforce that security interest may be
limited by law other than Revised Article 9 if that law either validates
or contains prohibitions or restrictions on the assignability or transfer
of the licensee's rights. 260 The secured party needs to make a
comprehensive legal analysis to determine whether there is such
other law before taking the security interest and, again, before
enforcing its security interest in the event of a default. If there is any
such law, the secured party must then determine the identity of the
other party to the license agreement, e.g., the licensor, and obtain that
party's consent before it can exercise its enforcement rights. Upon
those rights being sold, assigned, or transferred, the secured party's
258. Revised section 9-408 also applies to security interests in health-care-insurance
receivables, promissory notes, and payment intangibles. In order to focus solely upon licenses of
software, the quotations of Revised section 9-408 have used ellipses to delete references thereto.
See supra notes 248, 255, 257.
259. R. § 9-408(d).
260. Neither Article 9 nor the Official Comments indicate whether there is such other law or
what it provides. See id. § 9-408 cmt. 2.
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perfected security interest will then attach to the proceeds. 61 If there
is no such other law, there are then no restrictions against the secured
party enforcing its rights under Revised Article 9.
The practical problem for the secured party will be the
determination of whether there is a license agreement with which it
needs to be concerned. Much equipment, e.g., motor vehicles,
printing presses, and medical equipment, usually utilizes software. Is
that software subject to a license agreement that, under other law,
effectively limits the secured party's enforcement rights? Revised
Article 9 assists that determination by distinguishing between
"software" 262 which is a "type of general intangible '263 and, therefore,
is subject to the potential restrictions on enforcement 264 and so-called
"embedded software" which, instead, is treated as "goods": 265
"Software" means a computer program and any supporting
information provided in connection with a transaction relating to
the program. The term does not include a computer program that is
included in the definition of goods.266
"Goods" means all things that are movable when a security interest
attaches.... The term also includes a computer program embedded
in goods and any supporting information provided in connection
with a transaction relating to the program if (i) the program is
associated with the goods in such a manner that it customarily is
considered part of the goods, or (ii) by becoming the owner of the
goods, a person acquires a right to use the program in connection
with the goods. The term does not include a computer program
embedded in goods that consist solely of the medium in which the
program is embedded. The term also does not include ... general
intangibles .... 267
These mutually exclusive definitions are complex, technological-
ly fact-sensitive, and difficult to apply in practice. A secured party
repossessing sophisticated equipment collateral will have to
expeditiously determine whether it can treat the equipment as
"goods" and exercise its enforcement remedy of foreclosure without
delay, or whether it has to be concerned with prohibitions or
restrictions in a license agreement that necessitate communication
with and gaining the consent of a licensor. These problems, of course,
261. See id. § 9-408 cmts. 7-8.
262. See infra text accompanying note 266.
263. R. § 9-102 cmt. 25.
264. See id. § 9-408(d).
265. See infra text accompanying note 267.
266. R. § 9-102(a)(75).
267. Id. § 9-102(a)(44).
[Vol. 74:893
DEFA UL TAND ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS
exist under present law, but there has been little focus on the issues
and no guidance towards a resolution. Revised Article 9 not only
focuses attention upon the problems and potential risks but also
provides guidelines for dealing with them. How, whether, and to what
extent secured parties will be able to adjust to these new rules and
adapt their existing procedures remain to be seen.
V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS
A. Consequences of Noncompliance
Revised Article 9 expands the remedial provisions governing
noncompliance to cover violations of all of Article 9,268 not just the
provisions on default and enforcement.2 69 This allows an aggrieved
debtor, obligor, or holder of a competing security interest or lien to
seek injunctive or other equitable relief or to recover damages.
1. Commercial Transactions
Most importantly, Revised Article 9 resolves the issue under
present law concerning the effect of noncompliance with the
requirements for "collection, enforcement, disposition, or accept-
ance" of collateral. 270 This resolution, which has its greatest impact in
the context of a noncomplying secured party's ability to enforce a
deficiency claim, is applicable to all transactions other than consumer
transactions. 271 Revised Article 9 adopts the rule approved by the
majority of courts that have considered the issue, the "rebuttable
presumption" rule:
(a) [Applicable rules if amount of deficiency or surplus in issue.]
In an action arising from a transaction, other than a consumer
transaction, in which the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in
issue, the following rules apply:
(1) ....
(2) ....
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-628, if a
secured party fails to prove that the collection, enforce-
ment, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in
accordance with the provisions of this part relating to
collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance, the
268. See id. § 9-625(a)-(b).
269. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
270. See R. § 9-626 cmts. 2-4; Lloyd, supra note 1, at 721-24.
271. See R. § 9-626(a).
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liability of a debtor or a secondary obligor for a deficiency
is limited to an amount by which the sum of the secured
obligation, expenses, and attorney's fees exceeds the
greater of:
(A) the proceeds of the collection, enforcement, disposi-
tion, or acceptance; or
(B) the amount of proceeds that would have been real-
ized had the noncomplying secured party proceeded
in accordance with the provisions of this part relating
to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.
(4) For purposes of paragraph (3)(B), the amount of proceeds
that would have been realized is equal to the sum of the
secured obligation, expenses, and attorney's fees unless
the secured party proves that the amount is less than that
sum.
272
The reason for calling this the "rebuttable presumption" rule is
succinctly demonstrated by the following Official Comment:
Unless the secured party proves that compliance with the relevant
provisions would have yielded a smaller amount, under paragraph
(4) the amount that a complying collection, enforcement, or
disposition would have yielded is deemed to be equal to the
amount of the secured obligation, together with expenses and
attorney's fees. Thus, the secured party may not recover any
deficiency unless it meets this burden.273
A secured party which has objectively evaluated or assessed the value
of the collateral prior to conducting the disposition should usually be
able to assemble the factual proofs needed to satisfy this burden.274
A related issue concerns the effect of an elimination or reduction
of the deficiency claim under the rebuttable presumption rule upon a
claim for damages against the secured party arising out of its
noncompliance. Revised Article 9 resolves the issue with the
following new provision:
A debtor whose deficiency is eliminated under Section 9-626 may
recover damages for the loss of any surplus. However, a debtor or
secondary obligor whose deficiency is eliminated or reduced under
Section 9-626 may not otherwise recover under subsection (b) for
noncompliance with the provisions of this part relating to collec-
tion, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance .275
Thus, this resolution "eliminates the possibility of double recovery or
272. Id. § 9-626(a).
273. Id. § 9-626 cmt. 3.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57. Prudent secured parties "routinely make or
obtain valuations of the collateral prior to the foreclosure sale in order to establish an upset or
let go price." Rapson, supra note 1, at 498.
275. R. § 9-625(d).
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other over-compensation arising out of a reduction or elimination of a
deficiency. 27 6
2. Consumer Transactions
In consumer transactions, 27 7 the rules are quite different. If the
collateral is "consumer goods," an aggrieved debtor or secondary
obligor may recover, in any event, statutory damages for the secured
party's failure to comply with the default and enforcement provisions
(Part 6) of Revised Article 9.278
What is the effect in a consumer transaction on statutory
damages if the deficiency claim is reduced or eliminated? As a
component of the "consumer compromise, '279 the statute is
intentionally silent.280 Moreover, the statute is even silent as to the
consequences of noncompliance on the deficiency claim:
[Non-consumer transactions; no inference.] The limitation of the
rules in subsection (a) to transactions other than consumer
transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of
the proper rules in consumer transactions. The court may not infer
from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer
transactions and may continue to apply established approaches. 281
This "compromise" provision evolved because certain consumer
creditor advocates were strongly opposed to the Drafting
Committee's proposal to give state legislatures the alternative of
adopting for consumer transactions either the "absolute bar" rule
(which automatically eliminates the deficiency claim) or the
"rebuttable presumption" rule.28 2 These advocates were concerned
that the formulation of the "absolute bar" rule as an alternative to the
latter (which is applicable to all other transactions) would invite
enactment of the former. In turn, consumer advocates were
concerned that silence in the statute as to which rule should be
followed for consumer transactions would invite courts to follow the
"rebuttable presumption" rule. These consumer advocates reasoned
that because Revised Article 9 prescribes that rule for all other
276. Id. § 9-625 cmt. 3.
277. See supra note 119 (explaining the difference between "consumer transactions" and
"consumer-goods transactions").
278. See R. § 9-625(c)(2); supra text accompanying notes 119-33.
279. See supra note 23; infra text accompanying notes 280-87.
280. See R. § 9-625 cmt. 3 ("Because Section 9-626 does not apply to consumer transactions,
the statute is silent as to whether a double recovery or other over-compensation is possible in a
consumer transaction.").
281. Id. § 9-626(b).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 270-74.
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transactions,283 it might result in judicial reversals in those
jurisdictions (albeit a minority) where courts had previously adopted
the "absolute bar" rule. Accordingly, the two groups agreed upon the
above language284 which allows the court to fashion its own rules for
consumer transactions. In doing so, the court is supposed to close its
eyes to the fact that Revised Article 9 adopts the "rebuttable
presumption" rule for commercial transactions and did not adopt the
rule for consumer transactions. 85 As explained in the Official
Comment:
Consumer Transactions. Although subsection (a) adopts a version
of the rebuttable presumption rule for transactions other than
consumer transactions, with certain exceptions Part 6 does not
specify the effect of a secured party's noncompliance in consumer
transactions. (The exceptions are the provisions for the recovery of
damages in Section 9-625.) Subsection (b) provides that the
limitation of subsection (a) to transactions other than consumer
transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of
the proper rules in consumer transactions. It also instructs the court
not to draw any inference from the limitation as to the proper rules
for consumer transactions and leaves the court free to continue to
apply established approaches to those transactions.
Courts construing former Section 9-507 disagreed about the
consequences of a secured party's failure to comply with the re-
quirements of former Part 5. Three general approaches emerged.
Some courts have held that a noncomplying secured party may not
recover a deficiency (the "absolute bar" rule). A few courts held
that the debtor can offset against a claim to a deficiency all
damages recoverable under former Section 9-507 resulting from the
secured party's noncompliance (the "offset" rule). A plurality of
courts considering the issue held that the noncomplying secured
party is barred from recovering a deficiency unless it overcomes a
rebuttable presumption that compliance with former Part 5 would
have yielded an amount sufficient to satisfy the secured debt. In
addition to the nonuniformity resulting from court decisions, some
States enacted special rules governing the availability of deficien-
cies.286
Thus, where consumer transactions are involved, Revised Article 9
continues the uncertainty that exists under present law. The reader is
encouraged to form his or her own opinion as to the wisdom and
merits of this "consumer compromise. '287
283. See R. § 9-626(a)(3)-(4).
284. See supra text accompanying note 281.
285. See supra text accompanying note 281 ("The court may not infer from that
limitation .... ).
286. R. § 9-626 cmt. 4.
287. In his capacity as a member of the Drafting Committee, the author abstained, on
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B. Assignments to Secondary Obligors
In 1992, the author wrote an article, the title of which included
the question "What Does Section 9-504(5) Mean?" 2M8 This murky
provision deals with "transfers of collateral" to secondary obligors
that take place upon default. The article explored the meaning of the
phrases "repurchase agreement" and "transfer of collateral" used in
the present statute and asked for the meaning of "collateral" in this
context.2 89 What is an agreement for the "repurchase" of "collateral"?
Is it an agreement for the "repurchase of the paper," e.g., a
conditional sales contract of goods? Or is it an agreement for the
"repurchase" of the particular goods covered by that conditional sales
contract? 90
Agreements for the repurchase of the "paper" or for the
repurchase of the "goods" are both used extensively in commercial
financing. Each is a suretyship agreement, i.e., the person obligated to
repurchase is a "secondary obligor, ' '291 but the two agreements are
very different. A dealer in the business of selling or leasing goods
from inventory will often sell to a financial institution the chattel
paper 292 executed by its customers, e.g., conditional sales contracts
and leases, resulting from the sale or lease of the goods to buyers or
lessees in the ordinary course of business.2 93 Frequently the sale to the
grounds of process and substance, from voting for approval of this compromise. The Reporters,
who were not directly involved in the negotiation process, have diplomatically observed:
Finally, the proposed solution of the consumer-related issues has been recognized by
all concerned as a compromise. The statutory text that has emerged is less than ideal in
substance and approach. It represents a balance struck in the hope that it will enhance
the opportunities for prompt and uniform enactment of revised Article 9.
REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9-SECURED TRANSACTIONS,
REPORTER'S PREFATORY COMMENTS 1 50) (1998).
288. Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase (of Collateral?) Agreements and the Larger Issue of
Deficiency Actions: What Does Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 649 (1992).
289. See id. at 654.
290. See id. at 654-55.
291. See supra note 90; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY
§§ 1-2 (1996).
292. "Chattel paper" is defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(11) to mean
a record or records that evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in
specific goods, a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods, or a
lease of specific goods, or a lease of specific goods and license of software used in the
goods. In this paragraph, "monetary obligation" means a monetary obligation secured
by the goods or owed under a lease of the goods and includes a monetary obligation
with respect to software used in the goods. The term does not include charters or other
contracts involving the use or hire of a vessel. If a transaction is evidenced by records
that include an instrument or series of instruments, the group of records taken together
constitutes chattel paper.
293. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (defining "buyer in the ordinary course of business"); U.C.C.
§ 2A-103(1)(o) (defining "lessee in the ordinary course of business").
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financial institution will be under an agreement requiring the dealer
to "repurchase the paper" if its customer defaults in making payment.
That is, the "chattel paper" is to be reassigned to the dealer in return
for the dealer paying a "repurchase" price to the financial
institution- often an amount equal to the remaining balance due
under the chattel paper.
Other times, however, the agreement will require the dealer to
"repurchase" the actual goods if the customer defaults and the goods
are repossessed. In an analogous transaction, a manufacturer, as an
inducement to a financial institution to provide inventory financing to
a merchant that will purchase its products, agrees to "repurchase" the
inventory if the merchant defaults in its obligation to the financial
institution. In both instances, the obligation of the dealer or
manufacturer, as the case may be, to "repurchase the goods" is
conditioned upon it becoming the owner of the goods so that it can
then re-sell them from its own inventory. The dealer or manufacturer
will require, however, that the financial institution first take all
measures required by Article 9 to foreclose the interests of the
debtor294 and anyone else in the goods so that it can own the goods
"free and clear." The "repurchase price" is usually an amount totaling
the remaining balance due from the debtor under the chattel paper or
financing agreement, which total is allocated to two components
consisting of: the value of the goods being purchased; and if that value
is less than the remaining balance, the right to enforce the resulting
deficiency claim.295
Accordingly, in order for a repurchase of the goods to be
effectuated, the financial institution has to convey "clear title"-and
that can only be accomplished by a sale, disposition, or acceptance of
the collateral pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 governing
enforcement after default, i.e., nonjudicial or strict foreclosure. But
UCC section 9-504(5) causes confusion and problems by providing
that "[s]uch a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the
collateral under this Article. '' 296 That statement is an absolute
294. That is, the buyer under the conditional sales contract and the merchant receiving
inventory financing, as the case may be.
295. If the financial institution accomplishes the foreclosure by a sale to the dealer or
manufacturer for a purchase price that equals the remaining balance without an allocation
between these two components, the debtor will contend that the balance has been paid and
there is no deficiency. This contention is supported by the Official Comment, thus, making it
advisable to use this allocation in formulating the repurchase price. See R. § 9-618 cmt. 2; cf.
Rapson, supra note 288, at 674-76, 694-96.
296. U.C.C. § 9-504(5).
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nonsequitur in the context of an agreement for the repurchase of the
goods. Implementation of that agreement necessarily requires a "sale
or disposition" under Article 9-a reality that is wholly inconsistent
with the plain meaning of the statute.2 97 As the author concluded in
the article: "Notwithstanding the plain-meaning of the last sentence
of section 9-504(5), in order to effectuate the transfer of collateral to a
person liable under a repurchase agreement, there must be a sale or
disposition of the collateral in compliance with Part 5 of Article 9.'"298
The Drafting Committee directly confronted and resolved this
problem as well as some related issues. Revised Article 9 sets forth a
new formulation:
(a) [Rights and duties of secondary obligor.] A secondary obligor
acquires the rights and becomes obligated to perform the
duties of the secured party after the secondary obligor:
(1) receives an assignment of a secured obligation from the
secured party;
(2) receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party and
agrees to accept the rights and assume the duties of the
secured party; or
(3) is subrogated to the rights of a secured party with respect
to collateral.
(b) [Effect of assignment transfer, or subrogation.] An assign-
ment, transfer, or subrogation described in subsection (a):
(1) is not a disposition of collateral under Section 9-610, and
(2) relieves the secured party of further duties under this
article.299
This provision accomplishes the resolution by carving out from
its coverage agreements for the "transfer of collateral" if the
"collateral" is the property covered by the security agreement, i.e.,
the "goods," as distinguished from the security agreement itself, i.e.,
the "paper," such as a conditional sales contract or lease. As a result,
suretyship agreements for the "repurchase of goods," which
necessarily require a foreclosure sale or other disposition pursuant to
Article 9 in order to be implemented, 3° are not governed by this
provision.
The statute achieves this result by carefully limiting the kind of
"secondary obligor" that is covered. It refers to the secondary obligor
297. See id.
298. Rapson, supra note 288, at 680.
299. R. § 9-618.
300. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-610, 9-620.
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as one that "receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party
and agrees to .. . assume the duties of the secured party"0' 1 or is
"subrogated to the rights of a secured party with respect to
collateral.'30 That language has the effect of excluding a secondary
obligor that is agreeing to repurchase the goods because in such an
agreement, the secondary obligor does not agree to "assume the
duties of the secured party."303 Likewise, even though that secondary
obligor will be subrogated under suretyship principles 3° to the
secured party's rights against the debtor with respect to the
underlying debt, i.e., the deficiency claim, 305 it will not be subrogated
"with respect to collateral" because the security interest will have
been discharged by the foreclosure so that there is no longer any
"collateral. ' 30 6 Consequently, the statute is concerned only with
"assignments of secured obligations and other transactions
(regardless of form) that function like assignments of secured
obligations,' 307 e.g., "repurchases of paper." It is those transactions-
and only those transactions-that are "not a disposition of collateral
under Section 9-610." 308
The statute then goes on to deal with the corollary question of
whether the assignor-secured party has a continuing responsibility if
the assignee-secondary obligor thereafter fails to comply with the
duties it succeeds to as a secured party under Revised Article 9. This
troubling issue was also examined in the author's earlier article. 309
Present Article 9 is silent on the question and there is scant judicial
authority on the point.310 Under basic contract law, however, an
assignment does not relieve an assignor of its duties to a third
person.31'
Revised Article 9 resolves this issue by relieving the secured
301. Id. § 9-618(a)(2) (emphasis added).
302. Id. § 9-618(a)(3) (emphasis added).
303. Cf id. § 9-618(a)(2).
304. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY §§ 27-28 (1996).
305. See id. § 28(1)(a).
306. See R. §§ 9-617(a)(2), 9-622(a)(3).
307. Id. § 9-618 cmt. 2.
308. Id. § 9-618(b)(1).
309. See Rapson, supra note 288, at 697-700.
310. See, e.g., Stoppi v. Wilmington Trust Co., 518 A.2d 82, 85 (Del. 1986) (secured party is
not responsible); cf. MBank El Paso v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 153-54 (Tex. 1992) (secured
party is responsible because it cannot delegate away its duty of peaceful repossession).
311. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318(3) (1981) ("Unless the obligee
agrees otherwise, neither delegation of performance nor a contract to assume the duty made
with the obligor by the person delegated discharges any duty or liability of the delegating
obligor.").
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party of "further duties under this article. 312 The rationale is that it is
impractical to impose a continuing burden upon the assignor of the
secured obligation to thereafter monitor the assignee that has become
the secured party. This rule seems particularly justified in the
common circumstance where the purchaser of the chattel paper has
re-assigned the secured obligation to the dealer from whom it had
initially purchased the paper.
CONCLUSION
The treatment of enforcement rights and remedies in Revised
Article 9 is a great improvement over existing law- substantively,
procedurally, structurally, and in fairly balancing the interests of
secured parties and obligors. Revised Article 9 significantly enhances
the remedies of collection"3 and strict foreclosure 14 and provides
much needed procedural certainty to nonjudicial foreclosure. 315
Although "commercial reasonableness" continues to be the guiding
principle underlying the exercise of the enforcement rights and
remedies of collection and nonjudical foreclosure, Revised Article 9
provides important insights into its meaning and interpretation.316
Several provisions offer a more efficient and fairer treatment of
the much-litigated subject of deficiency claims. In particular, Revised
Article 9 provides a special method for calculating a deficiency in
those circumstances most susceptible to abuse-when the secured
party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor
acquires the collateral at a foreclosure disposition.3 17 That provision is
complemented by the requirement in consumer-goods transactions
that the secured party provide an explanation of how it calculated the
deficiency when requested to do so or before making written demand
for payment.31 8 Revised Article 9's expansion of the definition of
"good faith" to include "observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing" is consistent with the trend of other recent
revisions to the UCC and will deter inappropriate conduct.319 The
codification of the "rebuttable presumption" rule as the consequence
312. R. § 9-618(b)(2).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 25-78.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 176-215.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 79-175.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 134-40.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 141-57.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 158-71.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 44-51.
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of noncompliance with Article 9's enforcement provisions on
deficiency claims resolves an important issue. 20 Regrettably, there
was no resolution of this issue in consumer transactions, and the
"consumer compromise 3 21 prevented the Drafting Committee from
adopting other provisions that would have promoted fair treatment of
both consumers and secured creditors.
Finally, Revised Article 9 resolves many substantive issues and
provides guidance on numerous problems that exist under present
law, e.g., the relationship between Article 9 and suretyship law,
including the enforceability of waivers by secondary obligors3 22 and
harmonization of conflicting policies concerning alienability and
assignability of rights, particularly in the context of changed business
practices resulting from the development of computer and software
technology. 323
Revised Article 9's treatment of enforcement rights and
remedies is extensive and, at times, necessarily detailed and complex.
Careful study and attention are required. The author hopes that this
article will contribute to that effort.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 270-76.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 277-87.
32Z See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 216-67.
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